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 The predominant literature on time takes a decisively mentalistic view of timing 
which involves the modeling of internal timing devices. While the popular vein of timing 
research has produced large quantities of data on timing, still relatively little is known 
about tracking time for minutes at a time, over a period of time. Taking a behavior 
analytic approach, time is defined based on environmental change, and the act of tracking 
time is attending to relevant changing environmental change. This dissertation 
investigated the extensive philosophical and empirical literature regarding psychological 
timing. Focusing particularly on verbal humans, the discussion explores the opportunities 
for a more pragmatic approach to studying time, increasing the chances for future applied 
research. More specifically, the aim for the conducted studies were twofold: investigate 
the general patterns of timing responses in humans for longer durations (i.e., three 
minutes) over a sustained period (i.e., 30 minutes) and explore the conditions under 
which different verbal stimuli establish stimulus control over timing behavior. Results 
indicated that sampled groups tended to underestimate time when providing time 
estimates and overestimate time when producing intervals. Providing verbal antecedents 
successfully prompted the self-generation of timing rules, however, timing methods only 
appeared to effectively reduce timing error when participants’ timing responses were also 
verbal (i.e., time estimate). Significant interference effects were found between the two 
tasks required of the participants, particularly when the non-timing task presented as 
more challenging to the participant. The final discussion connects the dissertation 
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The topic of time has intrigued humans for millennia. Scholars believe that many 
ancient structures, such as the Egyptian time stick (c. 10th century B.C.) and Stonehenge 
in England (c. 2000-1500 B.C.), served as ways to understand hours and periods of the 
year (Priestly, 1964). Although humans have been creating devices to track time for 
thousands of years, there is still much to be learned about how we organize our behavior 
with respect to time. Time and timing interest many, particularly those who value, study, 
or otherwise are constrained by time. Although not universal, the concept of time has 
become an essential element in many cultures. Whether its viewed as linear, cyclical, or 
based on some other pattern, humans track events based on external environmental 
change (Scaglion, 1999).  
More specifically to the field of behavior analysis, many behavioral principles 
rely on temporal relations. Most notably, the latency between behavior and consequence 
has been studied in a variety of forms, from the early animal labs, delay discounting 
work, and feedback studies. Nevertheless, there is little cohesion between the researcher 
groups engaged in basic timing research, and most of the literature that has been 
produced, does not translate easily into practical application. 
There are a range of issues that arise from parallel programs of research 
developing in isolation. Matthews and Meck (2014) name three problems in the timing 
research: (1) the extreme susceptibility of temporal judgments to be manipulated by 
extraneous variables, (2) major findings are only robust at the group level and are washed 
out by idiosyncratic differences at the individual level, and (3) the external validity of 
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many time studies are suspect on the basis that most research is focused on activity and 
contexts that are highly contrived. These three concerns, along with those specific to 
behavior analysis, are the basis for the dissertation research discussed below. As a 
pragmatic science, behavior analysis has a history of focusing on behavior change that 
brings meaningful impact (Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968; Houmanfar, Alavosius, Morford, 
Herbst, & Reimer, 2015; Skinner, 1971). The issues with timing in our current society are 
countless: prioritization, writing effective “to do” lists, saving for retirement, punctuality, 
respecting deadlines, etc. By expanding our basic knowledge of time tracking for longer 
periods of time, and how that level of awareness is developed, applied researchers and 
practitioners could use these findings to create procedures that would enhance efficacy 
and efficiency of time-related tasks in people’s daily lives.  
Many scientists, have taken note of similar weaknesses within the timing 
literature, particularly when considering the potential impact of verbal behavior. Wearden 
(2008) commented on the citation gaps between disciplines covering the same 
phenomena. He mentioned that in articles discussing the role of language in timing 
repertoires there is very little mention of “the names of the researchers who have made 
major contributions to time perception research in recent years” (p. 163). As the field 
expands, it becomes more likely that parallel research programs will develop without 
much awareness of one another. From the other perspective of applied scientists and 
practitioners, Berman Brown and Herring ( 1998) mentioned how they failed to see any 
relevant and helpful information in the basic timing literature that would work well in the 
workplace. In this case, little or no overlap could indicate that the foundational group is 
not serving the needs of the consumer group. Either way, as isolation increases within 
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this subject matter, redundancies and missing opportunities to develop a coherent and 
cohesive basis for understanding timing issues also increases. 
The following sections provide an overview of various philosophical assumptions 
and how the differing assumptions about time affect the types of research conducted. 
Mainly, the discussion focuses on the ontology of time, whether it is stimulus or event, 
and the interactions between physiology and behavior acquisition as mechanisms for 
responding to time. The timing theories introduced are evaluated based on the values of 
coherence and pragmatism. The discussion then turns to a literature review of the 
representative basic studies highlighting the major findings in timing research.  
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to explicitly discuss verbal behavior as 
an important, but widely neglected, factor in human timing research. Further advances in 
timing research could be made by incorporating a functional account of language as a 
major factor for developing and maintaining timing repertoires. The primary aims of the 
tested methodologies were to provide a preliminary framework for investigating verbal 
stimuli as it interacts with various timing responses. The series of studies investigated 
factors for both increasing timing accuracy and reducing timing variability using verbal 
antecedents prompting attention to environmental change. The challenges of investigating 
timing repertoires at the individual and group level as well as manipulating verbal stimuli 
as an experimental variable are discussed, along with the implications and value of 
pursuing this line of research in the future.  
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II. Philosophy of Timing Research 
To begin, the difficulties in studying time is greatly linked to its challenging 
philosophical history. Better understanding of the underlying philosophical differences in 
approaching time, leads to making better research decisions , thus the following section 
discusses the primary challenges and philosophical disagreements regarding time within 
psychology. Next the manuscript addresses the values within the natural sciences and 
discuss timing philosophy with respect to those values. Finally, the discussion shifts to 
focus on behavior analysis as a suitable field for adding to the already substantive 
discussion on time. 
A. Unique problems with conceptualizing time 
Tracking time has been a major source of human ingenuity and creativity for 
thousands of years (Killeen, 2014; Priestley, 1964). There remains, however, a disparate 
treatment of time, largely based on differing foundational assumptions about what time 
“is.” Furthermore, there is disagreement as to how organisms respond to time. Outside of 
the natural sciences, there are scholars who speculate whether it is possible to be 
objective in analyzing time (Priestly, 1964; p. 12), and who internalize time and timing 
within the individual (see Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “On time”). 
Part of the variability and diversity of timing research could be from different 
views on how to treat time. The two major topics creating opposition are (1) whether time 
possesses stimulus qualities, and (2) whether organisms process time through an internal 
timing mechanism. Taking a stance on these topics builds a case for the larger timing 
issues of whether time is perceivable. Being clear about one’s assumptions regarding 
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time “perception” is important in defining the relevant behaviors. Differing assumptions 
about relevant behavioral origins has a significant impact on how timing research is 
conducted and analyzed. The following sections unpack the primary positions to 
determine a philosophical foundation on time that is consistent with behavior analysis. 
1. Defining time 
Many definitions of time share similar qualities but differ on important 
foundational issues. For example, few people would disagree that time is a constructed 
metric. A minute is always a minute no matter what country or universe one may be in. A 
minute is a constant and a standard, because humans have made it so. What is unusual 
about time as a metric, however, is that psychologists have historically internalized a 
process for detecting it. Whether organisms process time through an internal timing 
device (i.e., internal clock), or track environmental change, or senses time a priori, 
depends on the scientists’ perspectives on the causality of behavior. A sample of time 
definitions is listed in Table 1.  
Some of the difficulty of defining time philosophically is that historically, 
philosophers have analyzed time without the added empirical data available to inform 
them. Furthermore, philosophers questioned whether time was subject to empirical 
testing at all. Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Critique of Pure Reason, a highly influential 
work in the Western world, described time in the following way: 
Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. For 
simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the 
representation of time did not ground them a priori (Kant, 1998, p. 162).  
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 Kant’s analyses were advancements in a sense, in that he built off the positions of 
Newtonians and Leibniz (Kant, 1998; p. 7). At the time, there were debates as to whether 
time was absolute and independent of physical beings and events (i.e., the Newtonian 
position) or relative to the coexistence of objects and succession of events (i.e., Leibniz’s 
position; Alexander, 1956; p. xxv). Studying under Leibniz, Kant adopted similar 
positions, emphasizing the empirical physical over the metaphysical. For Kant, scientific 
analysis was important and having a philosophically sound description of time would be 
helpful for analyses. Kant sympathized with the relative nature of time by stating “time 
cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a 
position, etc.” (Kant, 1998, p. 163). With respect to space and time outside of the 
organism, his views fit the values of natural science. Within the organism, however, Kant 
begins to appeal to “intuition” and an “inner state” which aligns with his notion of a 
priori knowledge, or what some could consider the evolutionary history of the organism, 
that predisposes an individual to respond appropriately without being directly taught. 
Today one might say that humans have evolved in such a way to where we can 
organize and sequence events, both verbally and nonverbally. Most humans orient to 
environmental changes and develop verbal repertoires for predicting and planning. 
Nevertheless, by defining time as a stimulus to be perceived, the corresponding research 
based on that definition begins to investigate internal mechanisms for sensing time rather 
than identifying the overt behaviors involved when someone is described as “tracking 
time” by responding to relevant events.  
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J.J. Gibson’s (1975) pivotal chapter “Events are perceivable but time is not” has 
generated much discussion from timing researchers. At the time of this manuscript’s 
development, Google Scholar reports that Gibson’s article has been cited 210 times, with 
18 citations occurring in the last year (i.e., 2017), demonstrating its continued relevance. 
Beyond Gibson’s ecological background or his information-based theory of perception, 
most of the citations come from various disciplines discussing the matter of time. 
Gibson’s position was that time is “not perceived, and [it is] not prerequisite to 
perceiving” (p. 299). Although much timing literature does not include an explicit 
definition of time, much can be learned about the researchers’ assumptions by how they 
conducted their studies. The type of research that develops from Gibson’s definition 
looks distinct from research based on definitions implying internal clocks, or some form 
of temporal perception. The former sets the context for observing the environmental 
manipulations and corresponding behavior, whereas the latter place the emphasis on 
comparing behavior to formulae inferring mechanisms occurring within the organism. 
2. The perils of metaphor in time science 
At this point, it must be emphasized that this manuscript only considers 
philosophical assumptions and definitions that fit a natural scientific perspective. 
According to Marr (2009) “No object or phenomenon of study in any natural science is 
considered to be an agent unto itself, never mind endowed with some quality deemed 
‘free will’” (p. 106). Furthermore, an adequately scientific analysis of time should only 
include objective measures of the phenomena, in as directly a manner as possible. Until 
the last few centuries, many psychological events were thought to be inaccessible to 
empirical study and were either described as pertaining to a soul, intuition, or other 
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internal force that prohibited measurable observation. Oftentimes, describing 
psychological events involved metaphors to make visible the invisible. Time and timing 
are no different here.  
The likelihood of reification is particularly likely when the concept is invisible 
and abstract, like time. Gibson (1975) critiques Newton’s (1643-1727) treatment of time 
as absolute in “that events are what ‘fill’ time, as if time were a container into which 
events can be put. […] Time is not a receptacle for events” (p. 299). A more 
contemporary position on the metaphor of time as a container was made in Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, and Roche (2001): “Arranging a past, present, and future along a single 
so-called dimension is not the same as ordering a small, medium, and large box into a 
sequence of increasingly larger physical objects” (p. 37). As these authors and others 
have noted, the risk of applying metaphors for analyzing time is potentially leaving one’s 
assessment at the level of the metaphor as if it were real.  
Thinking of time as a container was helpful for mathematicians and physicists, 
but less so for psychologists. When one’s scholastic goal is to generate models that 
predict natural events, one is creating a modeled metaphor. For example, Killeen (2014) 
describes time as “based on motion. Sometimes the motion is linear, as sand or water 
through apertures. But most often time is abstracted from periodic motion, from 
oscillations” (p. 155). The distinction Killeen makes is an important one because it 
differentiates two views: one where time is treated like a thing, and one where time is 
treated like an event.   
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Whether it is a sundial or a model, we are attempting to make predictions based 
on previously observed patterns of events. They reveal our assumptions and shape the 
way research is built on those assumptions. Killeen’s metaphor emphasizes the Gibsonian 
perspective that timing is responding to events, whereas some cognitive models have 
viewed time and attention as containers for activity. These subtle initial differences may 
seem insubstantial until one examines the larger trends of research and their future 
opportunities for cohering with other scientific work. 
The next section explores the research outcomes and scientific trends for the two 
major views on time: time as stimulus and time as event.  
B. Time as stimulus 
Much of the mainstream timing literature proposes time as something to be 
perceived. Perception requires the body to sense through stimulation, which requires time 
to be a stimulus. If time is a stimulus, then temporality should be detectable through 
stimulation, much like pupils dilating in the presence of light or cochlear activity in the 
presence of sound. In the case of considering time as a stimulus, the assumption is that 
organisms perceive duration. Methodologically speaking, timing perception refers to the 
individual’s detection of a feature of a physical stimulus (e.g., light or sound durations). 
Many have also acknowledged that time does not fit with other physical stimuli (e.g., 
light, sound) which typically can be sensed on two different dimensions: quality and 
quantity, where quality is evaluated based on the type or form of the stimulus (e.g., 
middle C versus low B flat, in music) and quantity describes the stimulus magnitude 
(e.g., the volume of the note played). It may be easy enough to think of duration as 
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quantitative, but it is difficult to picture what the spectrum of temporal quality would 
look like.  
There are several timing theories that either promote or align with a “time as 
stimulus” assumption. Among the most well-known theories is the Scalar Expectancy 
Theory, or SET (Gibbon & Church, 1981). SET originated in the cognitive domain which 
views time as the “interaction of internal clock, memory, and decision processes” 
(Lejeune & Wearden, 2006). SET postulates that “time appreciate[s] in a linear fashion” 
(Gibbon & Church, 1981; p. 88), and proposes that cognitive processing devices (e.g., 
pacemaker, accumulator, long-term memory) “explain the temporal regularities of 
learned behavior” (Machado, 1997; p. 241). In another cognitive model, Treisman and 
colleagues use an oscillatory-based approach, which is similar to SET except that the 
former’s internal mechanism consists of multiple parts (i.e., the temporal oscillator and 
the calibration unit) instead of a single pacemaker (Treisman & Brogan, 1992). The 
existence of an internal timing mechanism is needed for these theories to work. Starting 
from the assumption that time is perceivable leads to the notion that organisms capable of 
responding to temporal constraints must possess some anatomy that processes time.  
In a variety of fields, the notion of an internal clock is readily accepted. As such, 
there are also many terms for this mechanism: biological clock, central timing device, 
information-processing device, oscillator, pacemaker, etc. There are also copious articles 
focusing on the neuroanatomy which may be responsible for time, such as the 
suprachiasmatic nucleus (Damiola et al., 2000), or the fronto-polar and lateral parietal 
cortex (Peters & Büchel, 2009). For the sake of clarity and concision, the remainder of 
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the paper will refer to any hypothetical construct or putative neuroanatomic process 
referring to perceiving time as an “internal clock.” It would be unfair, however, to claim 
that these models are entirely reliant upon an internal timing device, however. As 
Wearden (2008) points out, “The operation of the internal clock is just the first stage of 
the process that leads to time judgments, and the clock is embodied in a more complex 
cognitive mechanism involving both memories of duration” (p. 155). 
There are advantages to structuring research around an internal clock and its 
functions. Organisms tend to organize their behavior in a way that fits with standardized 
time and timing patterns. As such, there is some face validity to the notion that organisms 
are equipped with a physiology to detect time. Speaking directly to empirical 
productivity, a wealth of knowledge has accumulated regarding how organisms respond 
based on different temporal arrangements and contingencies, all in the name of 
determining how these internal clocks work. For example, in Grondin’s (2001) 
comprehensive review “Timing and time perception: A review of recent behavioral and 
neuroscience findings and theoretical directions,” he notes that those who subscribe to 
internal clocks are more likely to be interested in testing the capacities of organisms for 
short intervals (p. 567). Those tests have created a vast basis for understanding temporal 
discrimination for verbal and nonverbal organisms.  
Two significant critiques weaken the initial assumption of the internal clock. 
First, the limitations of looking for an internal clock are similar to the perils of using 
metaphor in science: over simplification and reification. Much in the same way that 
cognitive psychology has adopted the metaphor of the computer as an explanation for 
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how the brain “computes” sensory information, scientists have inferred a clock in our 
brains. Consistent with Skinner’s radical behaviorist view, L.J. Hayes (1992) states “there 
is little reason to assume that the workings of organic matter will ultimately be found to 
have the character of machine operations” (p. 140). Creating a specific and visual 
metaphor to a debatably invisible (or insubstantial) process like time is helpful for 
thinking about the complex subject matter; however, it is fallacious to assume that 
organisms function in the same way as the product constructed by those organisms. 
Secondly, the internal clock emerged from the original assumption that time is 
perceivable. From looking at how the history of our assessment of time and time 
processing has developed philosophically and then scientifically, the original 
presupposition of the internal clock is not founded upon observable, objective evidence. 
As Poynter (1989) highlights “the perception of time passage does not involve an obvious 
transduction of physical energy by a sensory organ” (p. 305). He continues to mention 
that even though there are physiological systems in our brains (e.g., suprachiasmatic 
nuclei) they are only considered to be clocks “because their biochemical functioning 
follows a cyclical pattern of change with a predictable period” (p. 305). To go the step 
farther to say that these cyclical patterns “cause” timing is still unknown. 
Even one of the more prolific time perception scholars, Simon Grondin, has 
expressed that time is not necessarily a stimulus, thus requiring no exteroceptor (2001). 
Even in the 21st century, inconclusive behavioral issues become a matter of the brain. 
Still needing an explanation for timing perception, Grondin stated that time perception is 
“simply an inner activity in the nervous system” (p. 23). Acknowledging the importance 
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of neural activity in human functioning is not problematic as long as the model fits the 
phenomenon. An example of a problem that arises based on assuming time perception by 
internal clock is that individuals are not skilled at reliably telling time without aid. 
Psychophysicists, and other scientists subscribing to the perception of time via central 
timing devices, create models to predict timing behavior, and also have to account for 
when the participant “errs.” It is not yet clear whether the participant’s timing is flawed 
or the researchers underlying assumptions. 
Despite these admitted issues, studying time in a similar manner to the perception 
of other physical stimuli provides a rich psychophysical framework and modeling to base 
a career’s worth of work. The literature on time perception is expansive, in no small part 
to its easily conducted procedures, relative rapidity of acquiring data, and the alignment 
with the mechanistic models that break phenomena down into smaller parts. Many 
scientists are content to look at time as a stimulus that can be perceived and collected by 
a physiological mechanism, not yet convincingly identified. It could also be the case that 
new researchers coming into the timing literature finds a vast array of timing articles that 
discuss time as a stimulus and learn to treat time similarly. Zakay (2016), seems to share 
a similar perspective with Grondin. While he considers the phrase “time perception” to be 
more metaphorical, “the overall perspective which sees time perception as part of the 
overall human perceptual system is justified” (p. 55). Whether the phrase is meant to be 
taken literally, clearly some ambiguity is created when scientists use scientific terms to 
explain scientific phenomena in a metaphorical sense. 
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C. Time as events 
 Returning to Gibson’s poignant 1975 chapter “Events are perceivable time is 
not,” we can now review the alternative position on time: time as an event. From his 
ecological framework, J.J. Gibson’s views on time capture the naturalistic perspective 
aligned with behavior analysis in that the primary source of behavioral influence is in the 
physical environment. Not all psychologists have accepted the Gibsonian view such as 
the notable time researcher Wearden (2008) who refers to the 1975 chapter title as 
“mischievous” and later states “Gibson may be alluding to the fact that no established 
‘organ’ for the perception of time has been identified, although, as noted earlier, the 
proposition that an internal clock exists has been useful for time psychologists” (p. 164). 
Unfortunately, Wearden’s only counterargument to Gibson’s position is to point out the 
research productivity in this subject area rather than providing an alternative theoretical 
stance. 
Rather than detecting “time,” a more parsimonious answer could be that the 
individual detects patterns of events, either in the environment or their own behavior, 
which allow for temporal points of reference. Establishing time as perceivable has proven 
difficult. On multiple levels, time does not fit in with the concepts of stimulus and the 
resulting stimulation of an organism. Lejeune, Richelle, and Wearden ( 2006) doubted 
that different durations of physical stimulus presentations should be considered to fall 
along the same stimulus continuum in the way that red and green stimuli do (p. 126). 
Fortunately, time does not have to be considered a stimulus to allow for empirical 
analysis. The accumulation of research on time suggests that “in spite of the absence of 
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specific receptor channels, duration is a type of information in its own right” (Lejeune, 
1998).  
Thinking about time as a measure of environmental events, is not a new concept. 
Over a century ago, William James commented in his section of Principles of Psychology 
(1890) “We have no sense for empty time” that “Awareness of change is thus the 
condition on which our perception of time’s flow depends” (p. 620). He further clarified 
that: “there exists no reason to suppose that empty time’s own changes are sufficient for 
the awareness of change to be aroused” (p. 620). James means that the environment is 
constantly changing regardless of whether an individual acknowledges those changes. 
Furthermore, one could interpret his words to mean that the passage of events in time is 
not sufficient for an individual to “perceive” time; thus, it is more the activating of 
attending to change that results in time perception.  
It is sometimes helpful to distinguish between time as a measure of event 
sequences versus time as past, present, and future. However, in terms of the theoretical 
assumption of how organisms track time, we can look at both processes in the same way. 
L.J. Hayes (1992) stated that the past and future “express a realization that although there 
is only now, now is a condition of continuous change” (p. 144). In her article about the 
psychological present, Hayes emphasizes that the only reality is the present and that the 
present is constantly evolving. Even though verbal humans can construct statements 
about the past or future, they will only ever be doing so in the present. Nine years later, 
S.C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche (2001) support this view:  
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In a nonarbitrary sense what underlies ‘time’ is merely change. Change is always 
unidirectional, from now to a new now, or from this to a new this, never from a 
new this to an old this. Nonverbal organisms are exquisitely sensitive to 
sequences of change […] but abstracting the physical dimension along which 
temporal / causal comparatives are arranged is a highly verbal action” (p. 34). 
Not only does viewing time as a measurement of change remove the difficulties of 
inferring an internal clock, but it also serves to answer other questions about time. For 
example, if time is the transpiring of events in the present moment, it is a simple way to 
further explain why things can never revert to the way things were. An event remembered 
is never the same as the event itself when it happened. An organism on an extinction 
protocol does not return to an unlearned state. Nevertheless, nostalgic statements about 
making a nation “great again” or dreaming about a future where equality exists are 
arbitrary verbal statements, about a past and future, taking place in the present. 
 Speaking less abstractly, Gibson (1975) spells out how he supposes that the 
biological organism tracks time as events rather than perceiving time itself. He states that 
contacting the present moment “comes from proprioception, that is, from the perception 
of the body of the observer himself as distinguished from his environment. […] What is 
experienced is a moving self in a stationary environment” (p. 300). Noticing relative 
change all contributes to how individuals learn and develop in time. 
 Just as the time perception labs have developed models, other psychologists have 
developed their own framework for tracking time based on changing contextual events. 
Less well-known but theoretically viable, is the change/segmentation approach developed 
by Poynter (1989). Sometimes referred to as the contextual change model, Poynter’s 
framework aligns with the assumption that time is no more than the interpretation of 
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change. Although Poynter was also sympathetic to a cognitive position, he denied the 
need for an internal clock, or “a single method for judging duration for all individuals and 
all contexts” (p. 309). Poynter states that the change/segmentation model relies on several 
variables such as “the duration of the interval to be judged, whether the judgment is 
‘prospective’ or retrospective’, and the temporal pattern of subintervals (regular vs. 
irregular)” (p. 310). Using these points, the change/segmentation model maps on well 
with behavioral theory.  
 Learning how one operates within an environment based on the context of 
standardized time is a helpful skillset when planning activities, making deadlines, or 
judging whether to drive through a yellow light. Yet, there are some legitimate barriers to 
studying the behavioral phenomenon of attending. Empirically, measuring a level of 
awareness is illusive. Contacting something either by touch or sight may imply that we 
have become “aware” of something; however, research on priming demonstrates that 
subtle cues may be presented and even looked at by an individual, but not “remembered.” 
Simply measuring eye-tracking, which would answer the question “Did this person see 
stimulus X?” does not resolve our issue of whether the individual was aware. The 
position of this manuscript and the following studies suggest that awareness can be 
discussed as the behavior of “orienting” and that it is extremely important on the basis for 
understanding how an individual learns about time based on change. Not only would this 
level of understanding aid the timing literature, but would also provide another 
foundational layer to operant theory. 
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Recent empirical work has supported Poynter’s model (Brown, 1995; 
Kladopoulos, Hemmes, & Brown, 2004). The advantages of adopting the contextual 
change model is that it relies on observable stimulus changes which can be objectively 
measured and strategically manipulated to produce findings that replicate data procured 
from cognitive psychologists. The theoretical advantage is that it is more parsimonious in 
that it does not assume hypothetical, mental entities intervening with the psychological 
process. 
 Attending to time has been widely acknowledged to be pivotal to time judgments, 
regardless of how one explains the nature of time and timing. Grondin (2001) himself has 
posed the question “In what way does attention influence the time perception process?” 
(p. 34). By looking at time as change, using procedures based in a behavior analytic 
tradition, a fruitful program of research could develop on the interrelation of attending 
repertoires and timing.  
Although he articulates the importance of observable events in the environment as 
the mechanism for tracking time, Poynter’s “change/segmentation” model is also rife 
with hypothetical constructs that may not be useful to a behavior analyst. Some points of 
derision may arise when a behaviorist reads about how Poytner (1989) explains that 
timing behavior, “is based on the ability to remember the sequence of events experienced 
during an interval, and to infer inter-event duration on the basis of the ‘intrinsic 
characteristic of that which endures’ in memory” (p. 309). For example, as he describes 
factors influencing timing accuracy, shorter time estimates are produced because the 
events “are poorly organized, yet have priority access to attentional capacity” (p. 317). 
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Attentional capacity is unclear, not to mention the conditions under which access to it is 
prioritized. Further, he explains “Events that are hard-to-remember, or dispersed in a way 
that does not lead to efficient storage of temporal segments, have little value as temporal 
markers” (p. 317). These assumptions begin a cycle of self-referential logic which has 
limited value for identifying the relevant features (topographical or functional) of the 
event.  
For behavior analysts, we may have to be willing to suspend judgment about the 
mentalistic philosophical assumptions in service of noticing the influential factors. As 
Poynter suggests, attending to salient changes in the environment is key. Tracking all 
changes in the environment is neither possible nor likely to be functional for the 
individual; thus noting that attention to relevant stimulus change is important for 
identifying the behavioral repertoire involved in timing responses. It’s not just attending 
to all change, but change that is meaningful for the organism. 
D. A behavior analyst’s theoretically consistent account of time 
Behavior analysts have a special kinship with time on multiple levels. For one, the 
strength of the within subject design with repeated measures are often tracked over time. 
Skinner’s cumulative record demonstrates orderly behavioral events under various 
conditions in real time, some of them even being time-related (e.g., fixed and variable 
schedules; Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Yet, behavior analysts have been careful not to 
overvalue time. Unlike traditional developmental psychology, time is never treated like a 
cause for behavior. Focus has remained on what individuals achieve within a time 
constraint or temporal context.  
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Some theoretical discussion about time has emerged in behavior analysis. Perhaps 
it is in response to one of the major assumptions that learning requires some involvement 
with one’s “learning history.” As mentioned previously, L.J. Hayes’s (1992) article on 
“The psychological present” discusses the problematic nature of one’s learning history as 
an explanation for events. She says “when the past to which we refer in saying ‘there was 
a past’ prevailed, it too was a present event: an earlier present” (p. 141) and later 
emphasizes, “From this perspective, a learning history may be conceptualized as a 
succession of present events, wherein each new present entails all previous presents” (p. 
143). Time as a context and a basis for philosophical discussion is no stranger in the 
behavioral field. 
Yet, there is even some distance between the more mainstream behavior analysis 
and the behavioral psychologists who study time. Few articles in the flagship journals of 
behavior analysis, particularly in the applied journals like Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis (JABA) and Journal of Organizational Behavior Management (JOBM) have 
discussed the relevant repertoires related to time. Even greater distances lay between 
behavioral scientists who have studied time and psychologists in other domains. Reading 
papers from various sources on a topic, there seems to be little overlap in cited sources. If 
groups of researchers read only the work of their familiar peers, the possibility of creating 
redundancy (or worse, unknown discord) greatly increases. 
One of the goals of this dissertation research is to begin bridging the gaps between 
labs and disciplines to work toward a more cohesive and coherent portrayal of time. 
Natural sciences studying phenomena with integrity should produce findings that cohere 
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with the findings in other scientific domains. Thus, behavior analysis as a natural science 
should approach the work of others with different assumptions eagerly, rather than 
defensively. The following review and research will attempt to embrace a wide range of 
work to ensure that the proposed empirical work is productively using the consistent 
findings across the timing spectrum. The section below will provide the specific values 
and framework from which the dissertation will unfold.  
1. Behavior analysis as a natural science 
From a philosophical point of view, we need to be clear about to what we refer 
when talking about time. For example, William James makes this point multiple times in 
his 1890 textbook Principles of Psychology (James, 1890). At one point, James analyzes 
the thought “the pack of cards is on the table” and how one may be tempted to 
deconstruct the sentence into smaller parts, such as the part of the thought about the cards 
and the part of the thought that is about the table to assemble the parts into knowing the 
whole. He states “What a thought is, and what it may be developed into, or explained to 
stand for, and be equivalent to, are two different things, not one” (p. 279). This 
differentiation becomes important when investigating the concept of time and an 
organism’s interaction with it, in that “To be conscious of a time interval at all is one 
thing; to tell whether it be shorter or longer than another interval is a different thing” 
(James, 1890; p. 614). James’ account of timing and separating a behavior from what is 
said about that behavior, is consistent with philosophical texts within behavior analysis. 
J.R. Kantor’s interbehavioral texts heavily emphasize this point as well. Kantor (1953) 
makes the distinction between “pristine data” and “transformed data” to separate the 
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thing or event itself from what is said about or constructed upon that thing or event (p. 
31).  
 Lejeune, Richelle, and Wearden (2006) mention Skinner’s resistance to treating 
time as a stimulus and refer to his discussion of temporal matters in The Behavior of 
Organisms: “the problem is how time as a dimension of nature enters into discriminative 
behavior,” (p. 132). The key phrase Skinner uses to describe time is “dimension of 
nature”; he does not describe it as a thing, neither necessarily a perceived event. He 
appeals to some feature of the natural environment to which an organism can orient and 
respond. 
A common misconception of behavior analysis is that because there is no appeal 
to the “hypothetical interior” that behaviorists deny the importance of the interior. As 
Thompson (2007) succinctly summarizes in his article on relating functional systems: 
“There is nothing inherent in a functional analysis of behavior that requires all of the 
variables to be located external to the skin” and elaborates upon multiple examples about 
how operant behavior co-occurs with “endogenous physiological and biochemical 
events” (p. 436). The behavioral perspective, upon which this dissertation is based, holds 
that the brain is not to treated as a mysterious black box of causality, rather as an organ 
necessary but insufficient to explain the behavioral event. More importantly, the 
inductive approach commonly adopted by behavior analysts allows to make steady, 
cumulative progress based on the evidence without making assumptions about 
hypothetical entities. Behavioral theory “insist[s] that behavior presents a primary datum 
for psychology which is not to be treated as a mere symptom of underlying structures of 
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either the cognitive or physiological kind” (Costall, 1984). Rather than acknowledging 
that the organism possesses an internal clock to correctly or incorrectly tell time, it may 
be more parsimonious to accept that there is another behavioral process at work. 
No one scientific discipline bears the responsibility of explaining natural 
phenomena from all levels of analysis. Neuroscientists, biologists, and psychophysicists, 
have produced work on time that is consistent with their targeted level of analysis (i.e., 
neural networks, cellular processes of living organisms, predictive models of animal 
behavior). Maintaining focus on the behavioral level of analysis creates the space needed 
to investigate time from a behavior science perspective, without requiring inference of 
physiological and mental mechanisms. Lejeune, Richelle, and Wearden (2006) cite the 
importance of Skinner’s early work on operant methodology and externally-focused, 
naturalistic theory on the development of animal timing research. As they put it, 
Skinner’s theory is useful for explaining “how it happens that animals and humans can 
show sensitivity to temporal properties of events” without requiring direct perception of 
time as a stimulus (p. 125). So long as the work of science is done in a naturalistic, 
parsimonious way, in theory all disciplines’ findings on time should coalesce.  
2. Comprehensive is not eclectic 
The value in thinking about developing scientific investigations systemically is in 
the quality of the outcome: a productive and progressive knowledge base that stimulates 
both basic research and application. Building a program of research that is both 
philosophically grounded but transcendent of disciplinary boundaries promotes two 
important qualities in research: comprehensiveness and parsimony. Heuristically, the two 
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may seem diametrically opposed in that to be comprehensive you might consider all 
possible factors responsible for a phenomenon, making for a complex analysis; whereas, 
to achieve parsimony, one may think about the ‘silver bullet’ explanation that accounts 
for the studied phenomenon. Upon further reflection, the beauty in science is that truly 
parsimonious explanations also function comprehensively.  
 Building more systemic research agendas that demonstrate coherence across 
areas of interest related to a construct like “time” would be valuable. That is not the same 
as saying that one’s scientific study should meet the needs for all researchers. As 
previously discussed, part of the difficulty in studying time and time-related issues is that 
time has been conceptualized differently in different disciplines. Most fundamentally, 
there are disagreements about what time “is,” let alone to what matters time applies, and 
in what capacity. Thus enters the potential problems of eclecticism. Colleagues at Yale 
University, Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001) differentiated between what they called 
“unified psychology” and eclecticism. From their views on how research institutions 
categorized subdomains of psychology, they illustrate how the organizational system 
creates contingencies for siloed work rather than unified study. They have also 
highlighted the problems with eclectic collection of ideas or techniques “but they may not 
sufficiently synthesize them to truly be unified psychologists” (p. 1078).  
Being able to draw relations among scientific findings across disciplines may 
create a more robust analysis but is rarely sought. For example, in timing research, 
domain labels (i.e., behavioral, cognitive) are ignored which seems to embrace an 
interdisciplinary, systemic research agenda. Problems may arise, however, if the 
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underlying philosophical tenets are also ignored, creating conceptual confusion in the 
literature. Part of this could be due to what Costall (1984) noted about the theoretical 
levity some scientists have taken with time: “cognitive psychologists have felt free to 
disregard [Skinner’s] metaphysical criticisms and insist that choice of means and ends in 
sciences is merely a matter of taste” (p. 110). Successful comprehensive analyses should 
also be unified, or synthesized in a way that does not conflate opposing philosophies into 
an uninterpretable black hole. Such voids exist in the timing literature, which could be a 
reason why the precision and depth of timing investigations are expanding but the scope 
is narrowing. 
Promoting experimental work that fills in the gaps between isolated research areas 
can more effectively point the scientist into more constructive and progressive directions. 
Scientific activity is cumulative and progressive, which according to Kantor (1958), 
“constitutes an enterprise for ascertaining the structure, operation, and interrelation of 
things and events,” (p. 98). Reese (1989) cited the various categories by which theories 
may be evaluated, focusing on “progress.” He stated “A theory or an approach is 
progressing if its scope is being widened and/or if its precision is being increased” (p. 
22). Arguably, the precision of timing models are increasing; but it is difficult to assess 
the external validity or generalization of some of these findings. For example, some 
models successfully predict timing judgments for only short durations (i.e., 2 to 4 
seconds) or only for static behavior patterns (Machado, 1997). The volume of timing 
research swells, but for most, it appears the aim is to increase precision of the previously 
established timing conditions and procedures. It is debatable whether the scope of timing 
research has expanded in a way to call it progressive. 
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While progress should not be the only point of evaluation, strong theories produce 
progressive research which sets the occasion for greater applicability. In timing research 
one can see there are certain areas at risk for losing their progressive edge. Not to be 
confused with productivity, progress leads to the exploration of phenomena at greater 
scope, breadth, and depth (S.C. Hayes, Barlow, & Nelson-Gray, 1999). When a scientific 
domain has invalid assumptions, and is inconsistent with the goals of natural science, 
progress is inherently limited. S.C. Hayes and Berens (2004) present an additional 
perspective which posits that “a bottom-up strategy only makes sense if it actually leads 
to analytic-abstractive theories of complex behavioral events. Behavioral principles are 
not ends in themselves” (p. 343). Put in another way, science should produce increasingly 
comprehensive conclusions from the accumulation and extension of theoretically 
consistent findings. The timing literature has developed solid frameworks of increasingly 
complex findings about particular timing conditions, but there has been little forward 
movement to understanding how these findings generalize to larger, naturalistic temporal 
repertoires. 
3. Parsimony is not restrictive 
Building a coherent foundation of knowledge around any phenomenon will result 
in an increasingly complex analysis of it. That does not require, however, that the 
theoretical assumptions must also be complex. Parsimony, or valuing the simplest 
reasonable explanation for an event, can help as a guide for choosing among multiple 
theoretical approaches. For example, Poynter (1989) who advocated for a contextual 
change model of time mentioned that accuracy in Poynter and Homa’s (1983) study was 
greater in empty intervals which could be explained in change/segmentation terms, 
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accuracy resulted from “freedom to mentally generate individual- and duration-specific 
markers for efficient storage and retrieval of temporal information” (p. 318). These 
assumptions are problematic because it adds a layer of hypothetical mechanisms which 
cannot be (or at least have not yet been) observed. Even though the change model holds 
considerable value in orienting the scientist to the manipulable environment, basing its 
validity upon a mentalistic framework jeopardizes the whole enterprise. 
Overall, the goal of the current investigation is to construct research that is 
systemically integrated with the existing literature. One may look at a parsimonious 
conclusion as being merely simple, or overly restrictive in a way that is too general or 
isolated to do much good (Shimp, 1999). Although topographically simple, the function 
of parsimony should afford multiple avenues of research across disciplines. In some 
ways, adding layers of unnecessary complexity adds rigidity to the process that distracts 
the researcher from contributing to the overall goal of increasing precision, scope, and 
depth.  
Evidence that may not support the Poynter’s tenets of “mental freedom” and 
“efficient storage” could also lead to scientists rejecting contextual change as a promising 
avenue of research. Just as eclecticism sets the occasion for disorganized and confusing 
research programs, excessively complex explanations beyond what the scientific 
evidence demonstrates introduce unnecessarily restrictive, and potentially invalid 
investigations. If we have evidence indicating that orienting to relevant environmental 
change leads to improved timing, there may be greater risk than benefit in pursuing 
additional hypothetical mechanism. Ironically, Poynter (1989) cites “parsimony” as a 
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distinct advantage of his change/segmentation model over the other cognitive timing 
models. Relative to the models he was examining, he was right to reject the notion of the 
internal clock “by accounting for the ‘nontemporal’ change between delimiting events” 
(p. 329); however, from a behavior analytic perspective, further simplicity can be 
achieved by avoiding notions of temporal perception via internal clocks altogether. 
4. Comprehensive parsimony in functional contextualism 
In reviewing the extensive literature on time, particularly when crossing into other 
psychological domains, it becomes necessary to firmly establish the philosophical core of 
the arguments one plans to make in defense of their empirical work. In the past several 
decades, more behavior analysts have discussed the explicit declaration of a philosophical 
worldview and the merits therein. Starting principally with S.C. Hayes, L.J. Hayes, and 
Reese in 1988, they reviewed Steven Pepper’s (1942) philosophical text World 
Hypotheses as a vehicle for introducing the clarity that is gained by adhering to a 
particular worldview (c.f. Marr, 2009). Pepper posited that all philosophical positions can 
be reduced to four core philosophies, each with its own root metaphor: formism, 
mechanism, organicism, and contextualism. Most behavior analysts are most familiar 
with mechanism and contextualism, based on the historical development of behaviorally 
theory and research.  
The primary goal in mechanism is to break the phenomena of interest into 
increasingly smaller parts to understand the larger whole. Although rarely explicitly 
stated, much of timing research fits within the mechanistic worldview. To better 
understand timing repertoires, researchers have taken specific aspects of timing (e.g., 
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discrimination between stimuli presented at different intervals). Whether with humans, 
pigeons, or mice, research is conducted in a laboratory setting with tightly controlled 
conditions where the only changes occurring are the pre-programmed tasks. It is rarely 
stated, but the implicit assumption of this accumulation of timing research is that it will 
cohere into a larger knowledge-base for how organisms interact with time. Mechanism is 
a traditional and lauded form of scientific research. It can be predictable and conservative 
in service of its success criterion; however, a critique of mechanism is that it can lead to 
“science for science sake.” This, of course, is only a problem if one’s perspective is that 
science should bear impact on a larger level. 
S.C. Hayes, L.J. Hayes, and Reese (1988) identified contextualism as the 
framework that fits best for behavior analysts for whom producing research with 
pragmatic and applicable effects is their analytical goal. Later articles building off this 
seminal piece (S.C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012; Vilardaga, S.C. Hayes, 
Levin, & Muto, 2009) introduced “functional contextualism” which aims “to predict-and-
influence, with precision, scope, and depth, whole organisms interacting in and with a 
context considered historically and situationally” (S. C. Hayes et al., 2012; p.4). 
Successful research questions advocate for “successful working” which is a pragmatic 
goal, recognizing the “truth” of findings based on how well it works in its relevant 
context (S.C. Hayes, 2004). Adopting successful working places a different contingency 
on researchers studying natural phenomena. Although experimental control is highly 
valued by all scientists, those subscribing to a contextual worldview focus on research 
with high external validity.  
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Those applying functional contextualism to timing would be more interested in 
investigating a timing repertoire as a holistic, observable event under conditions 
supporting externally valid findings. They would support stating their scientific goal “a 
priori in order to serve as a guide to pragmatic truth” (Vilardaga et al., 2009; p. 110) 
wherein this “ultimate goal” is the prediction and influence of behavioral events as 
manipulated by the environment (i.e., context; (S. C. Hayes, 2004; p. 647). There is little 
to no timing research that adopts this perspective. Machado (1997) specifically 
mentioned that neither SET nor BeT, two of the most common timing models, speak to 
the acquisition of timing repertoires. Furthermore, very little research to date has 
explored the functional contribution of verbal behavior on timing.  
The current literature review attempts to expand upon the existing time literature 
such that the work done outside of behavior analysis is addressed to provide a roadmap 
for functional contextualist goals. Additionally, the bulk of the timing research has 
mechanistic elements and should not only be appreciated for their contribution to science 
but also evaluated based on mechanistic goals. It is not constructive to critique 
psychophysics literature on the just-noticeable-difference of short intervals based on the 
fact that it does not readily apply to ‘real life’ (Shimp, 1999). Thus, for the following 
review of the literature, summaries and conclusions will be based on the assumed intent 
with which the research was conducted. The conducted research for the dissertation 
project, however, attempts to bring what we know about mechanistic timing so we can 
apply it to more generalized, externally valid settings for verbal humans. 
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III. Timing Research 
Moving away from a philosophical discussion, we will present a representative 
sample of findings from basic timing research. Understanding the commonly used 
approaches to investigating timing has helped with the development of the studies 
conducted. Regardless of the mechanism(s) responsible for timing repertoires, there is a 
vast array of data that paint a comprehensive picture regarding the relative capacity of 
individuals to time and sequence their activities and environment with some degree of 
accuracy. 
A. Timing research from different perspectives 
To begin reviewing the timing literature, the discussion will acknowledge the 
value of the work done in psychological domains outside of behavior analysis. The 
problem of scientific silos is not a new issue. Over 100 years ago, Edwin Holt, J.J. 
Gibson’s mentor, stated, “Will it not be a source of strength for all if [psychologists] can 
manage to keep a sympathetic eye on the methods and discoveries of one another?” (from 
Holt, 1915, as quoted by Costall, 1984). One could argue that the current discord 
observed within the timing research is the accumulation of empirical isolation over 
several generations. A review of the representative literature in different domains will 
help orient the conversation to a more inclusive, comprehensive analysis going forward. 
1. Psychophysics of time 
 Whenever the research question may be construed in terms of perception, there 
are likely to be psychophysicists studying it. According to Merriam Webster 
psychophysics is “the branch of psychology concerned with the effect of physical 
32 
 
processes (as intensity of stimulation) on the mental processes of an organism.” As the 
name implies, this work is highly mathematical and measures psychological responses as 
a function of stimulus quality and quantity. Regardless of differing philosophical 
perspectives on defining time, “Since the nineteenth century, psychophysics has explored 
time perception in humans by using classical procedures, involving the discrimination, 
production, reproduction, or comparison of durations” (Lejeune, Richelle, & Wearden, 
2006; p. 129). Time has been a fruitful subject matter for psychophysicists and has 
produced increasingly complex models for how individuals interact with temporal 
features of the environment.  
As Lejeune and colleagues (2006) note, the psychophysics of time has been 
discussed similarly to other forms of perception, such as with visual and auditory stimuli. 
Many empirical questions have been posed, and among them, “Two principal issues 
arose. One concerned the relation between mean measures of time judgement and the 
real-time values of presented events … [and] The other issue concerned relations between 
variability of time judgements and the mean” (p. 129). That is, the issues of timing 
accuracy and timing variability. When studying how well organisms can tell time without 
a clock, it seems natural to compare subjective time (i.e., the individual’s reported 
experience) with objective time (i.e., time as a metric). Timing accuracy may be 
questionable, particularly with longer durations, but researchers may also find timing 
variability important to consider. After all, if there is no universal time except the man-
made construct, some may argue that organisms may have developed to detect steady 
patterns which would allow them to respond with low variability, even if they were 
consistently inaccurate.  
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In a sense, psychophysics tests the organism’s capacity for perceiving noticeable 
differences between stimuli as well as how well the individual perceives stimulus 
changes, like in scalar timing. At least for short periods of time, humans and animals can 
detect, either visually or audibly, a noticeable difference between two interval lengths. 
Furthermore, timing perception is said to be manipulable based on how different 
durations of stimuli are presented sequentially (see Grondin & Plourde, 2007 and Killeen, 
2014, among others, about the kappa effect). Psychophysics literature has also 
demonstrated that sensitivity of discrimination between two different durations decreases 
as the intervals increase (Grondin, 2012; Lejeune & Wearden, 2006). Based on these 
findings, researchers have discussed the “scalar” property of time; that is, that the 
individual’s sense of temporal relations alter in an orderly fashion as the interval changes. 
The hallmark of psychophysics is in its mathematical modeling of psychological 
phenomena as it relates to systematic variation of physical stimuli. In addition to using 
theories of timing models, much of the psychophysical literature relies upon general 
principles like Weber’s law (Grondin, Meilleur-Wells, & Lachance, 1999; Namboodiri, 
Mihalas, & Shuler, 2016), which is a ratio asserted to be a constant in determining how 
great a stimulus change must occur for an individual to notice the difference between the 
two stimuli. Based on this tradition of modeling formulae to predict behavior related to 
time, studies conducted in this area search for inconsistencies in the established 
theoretical models. Even the highly cited and validated Weber’s law has been challenged 
in that the Weber’s fraction only reliably predicts behavior for a narrow range of 
durations (e.g., 0.2 to 2 seconds; Bizo, Chu, Sanabria, & Killeen, 2006). Grondin (2001) 
summarizes the scholastic style of the psychophysics domain by his comments on Weber:  
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Weber’s law is actually not a law, nor is it a goal; it is a guide, a principle. It helps 
integrate research results in an orderly view but should not prevent researchers 
from observing other principles, or laws, waiting to be uncovered (p. 38). 
As such, the literature on time from a psychophysics is iterative, highly inductive, and 
results in constant meticulous recommendations for updating models. 
 Although the focus of this dissertation research does not focus on mathematical 
modeling for predicting the timing behaviors of long intervals, it is worth briefly 
summarizing the more commonly used timing theories used in psychophysics. It is still 
largely unknown how adequately these models account for timing behavior for longer 
durations (i.e., three or more minutes) and future studies may want to consider how the 
data below fit within such models.  
A commonly cited cognitive theory of timing that was introduced previously is 
the scalar expectancy theory (SET) which “explains timed behavior in terms of an 
interaction of internal clock, memory, and decision processes” (Lejeune, Richelle, & 
Wearden, 2006; p. 130). Specifically, SET gets its name by the theory that temporal 
estimates are related to perceived distance to reinforcement (i.e., expectancy) and that the 
variance of temporal discrimination divided by the mean temporal estimates will predict 
responding (i.e., scalar; Lejeune, 1998; p. 132-133). Support for SET continues to 
accumulate (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008), although there have been studies that do not 
support SET (Grondin, 2012). 
Other models have been developed to explain timing repertoires without an 
internal clock. Jones and Boltz (1989) is a cognitive model that does not utilize a central 
timing device. Instead, they focus on the role of attention called the “dynamic attending 
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approach.” Similar to the Poynter’s change/segmentation approach (1989), the dynamic 
attending approach accounts for timing behaviors through attending to changes in the 
environment. Jones and Boltz’s seminal article on the dynamic attending theory aimed to 
show that both “analyses of event structure are critical to theories of attending… [and] 
attend[ing] to events that vary in temporal coherence” are empirically viable and 
necessary for conceptualizing time (p. 461-462). Jones and Boltz’s model is consistent 
with the ecological perspective that time can be thought of as events and the degree to 
which change occurs functions differently for the organism. As a model for predicting 
sensitivity to intervals of an event, dynamic attending theory holds two main 
assumptions: that there are “external rhythms, which are created by distal events, and 
internal rhythms, which actively generate temporal expectancies” (Large & Jones, 1999). 
Support has also been demonstrated for this perspective (Henry & Herrmann, 2014; M. 
R. Jones, Moynihan, Mackenzie, & Pue, 2002). 
Several behavioral models exist to describe timing behaviors. One of the most 
common model is the Behavioral Theory of Timing (BeT; Killeen & Fetterman, 1988) 
wherein they “presume that the adjunctive behaviors may come to serve as discriminative 
stimuli for subsequent responses” and that “behavior is the mediator of temporal control 
(p. 274). While the foundations for this theory fit very well with behavior analysis, BeT 
has appealed to many scientists with psychophysical interests. BeT proposes 
mathematical models, based on a Poisson process wherein “the pacemaker rate varies 
proportionally with the rate of reinforcement” (Lejeune, Richelle, & Wearden, 2006; p. 
138). Building off the idea of temporal regulation from a sequence of behavioral states, 
Machado (1997) proposed the Learning-to-Time (LeT) theory which is meant to address 
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the behavior change that occurs when an organism learns a new skill (in this case, 
timing). These behavioral models (among others, read Lejeune, Richelle, & Wearden, 
2006 for a review of the most common behavioral timing models and how they contribute 
to the research on animal timing) have set the occasion for much research to be done, but 
may also make one wonder about all the different time theories that have emerged over 
the past several decades. 
What is promising about predictive modeling is that the search to understand 
timing interactions has produced a strong basis of inductive, integrative work. Embracing 
the values of skepticism, these scientists have been both extremely transparent about their 
processes and findings, and have begun evaluating their interrelatedness As Machado, 
Malheiro, and Erlhagen (2009) described it “examining the two models [SET and LeT] 
jointly has proved to be a fruitful exercise because it has led us to identify not only 
serious problems with each model but also important but unknown properties of timing 
and temporal memory” (p. 424). Establishing more systemic timing research leads to new 
avenues for exploration. Assessing and analyzing theories and practices across scientific 
domains can not only provide areas for improvement upon the theories and practices but 
also the synthesized findings may reveal greater unknowns to be explored. Machado and 
colleagues summarize this point nicely by stating “Through variation and selection our 
models evolve and, we hope, come to depict reality a bit more accurately than before” (p. 
447). As the literature review continues, one may consider how well these other domains 
reference each other, and what possible good could come from doing so. 
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2. Timing temporal cues: Prospective and retrospective timing 
In addition to using mathematical formulae to better understand timing, 
researchers have manipulated various procedures to investigate the various contextual 
factors that influence timing accuracy and variability. Killeen and Fetterman, (1988) in 
discussing other timing models, provide guidance on sorting time designs based on 
asking questions about the conditions under which timing is measured. For example, 
contingent behavior responding to time that has passed differs from the behavior that 
emerges in anticipation of a timed interval (p. 276). Subsequently, a portion of the timing 
research evaluates the differences between those two procedures. Prospective timing is 
where some form of antecedent signals to the individual (human or non) that they will be 
prompted to report on the duration of a stimulus after it has been presented. Retrospective 
timing is the opposite, where a stimulus is presented and then the individual is prompted 
to report on the estimated duration of the stimulus presentation. For example, a person 
may hear a tone for a period. After the tone stops, the individual may be prompted to 
report on how long they thought it was. If the person was never told previously that they 
would be responsible for reporting the duration of the stimulus, this would be considered 
retrospective timing. If the person was told in advance that would be considered 
prospective timing.  
In a recent animal timing study, Fetterman and Killeen (2010) investigated the 
degree to which pigeons accurately responded to prospective and retrospective timing 
conditions. In their study, pigeons were exposed to two different temporal ranges, short 
and long. For the short range, a pigeon either saw a light for either 2.5 second or for 5 
seconds; and with the long range, the pigeon either saw a light for 5 seconds or for 10 
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seconds. During training, red lights were associated with the short range and green lights 
were associated with the long range. After observing the light, the pigeon pecks one of 
two choice keys to indicate that it was either short or long based on that range. For 
example, if the light is red for 5 seconds, the correct response would be “long;” but if the 
light is green for 5 seconds, the correct response would be “short.” In the experimental 
phases, the red or green lights appeared at different time points, either during the stimulus 
presentation (i.e., prospective), or during the choice selection (i.e., retrospective). 
Significant results indicated that pigeons showed greater accuracy, which is correctly 
identifying duration based on a particular range, in the prospective condition. There was 
also an additional condition which further demonstrated that the light color during the 
stimulus presentation exerted greater stimulus control over timing judgments than the 
color of the lights at the choice point.  
Fetterman and Killeen (2010) make a strong case for how organisms evaluate 
time and the potential environmental features responsible for enhancing timing accuracy. 
As they put it, “The main question is what kind of behavioral mechanism can account for 
the difference between retrospective and prospective timing” (p. 124). When comparing 
cognitive versus behavioral models of timing, these findings are crucial. Fetterman and 
Killeen describe SET (a cognitive model), as “context independent […] Stated another 
way, SET is inherently retrospective, because the cognitive machinery cannot be brought 
to bear on the discrimination until the choice stimuli are available” (p. 124). Their data 
from the 2010 studies do not support SET, in that “Range information during the choice 
(and not during the sample) is much less useful than range information during the sample 
(whether or not range information is present during the choice)” (p. 124).  
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Many studies have repeatedly shown that organisms track time better under 
prospective timing conditions (Grondin, 2001). In addition to increased effectiveness, 
there are significant feasibility concerns with running multiple retrospective trials. When 
verbal humans experience multiple trials for a retrospective timing procedure, they may 
begin prospective timing without instruction after the first few exposures. Thus, the 
following studies were conducted with a form of prospective timing procedure. 
3. Interference Effects 
Beyond modeling or sequencing of timing cues, researchers have also 
investigated how well individuals track time while engaging in other, non-temporal 
activities. One of the most established and replicable effects in the timing literature is the 
interference effect (Brown, 1997). As the name implies, the interference effect “refers to 
a disruption in timing performance produced by a concurrent nontemporal distractor 
task” (Brown, 2014). The interference effect is an example of timing research that more 
closely aligns with a functional contextualist’s analytical goals in that the phenomenon 
claims to identify the conditions under which and to what degree concurrent tasks or task 
interruption may affect timing accuracy. These research questions produce results that a 
more easily interpretable for scientific applications than the just-noticeable-difference 
studies often found in the traditional psychophysics literature. 
As a brief review of the interference literature, there are some common findings 
worth reporting. (For more extensive reviews of the interference effect, look to Brown, 
1997 and Fortin & Massé, 2000). Decades of research shows that responding allocated to 
nontemporal tasks disrupts timing responses, and has been demonstrated in both animals 
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and humans. Furthermore, Fortin (1999) concluded, based on extensively reviewing the 
literature, that combining nontemporal tasks with temporal production resulted in 
significantly greater time intervals than the target duration (p. 315). In another approach 
to temporal interference, Dormal, Seron, and Pesenti (2006) investigated the interrelation 
of timing estimates and the number of stimuli presented (the quantitative element they 
called “numerosity”). They found that “there was a clear interference effect of numerical 
cues on response latencies” but that the interference was not bi-directional (p. 118; cf.  
Brown, 2006). That is, temporal cues did not result in a similar interference effect for 
numerosity. One could interpret these findings to support two claims: (1) that time is not 
a stimulus unto itself that can facilitate or interfere with other processes, and (2) that 
accurately tracking time requires some form of attending behavior. 
The interference effect is related to the work Brown and colleagues have 
conducted on sequences of events. Brown (2014) highlighted the relation between timing 
and sequencing as related, and potentially competing, repertoires. His general findings 
showed that “concurrent reasoning tasks also increased timing variability […] finding 
that timing performance is very sensitive to nontemporal processing demands” (p. 95), 
and timing interfered with sequencing. Brown explained these findings by stating that 
these two processes competed for “the same pool of attentional resources” (p. 95). While 
behavior analysts would discuss the phenomenon in terms of response allocation, there is 
validity to the idea that individuals would be unsuccessful at engaging in multiple 
complex behaviors at the same time. 
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Overall, the support for interference effects in timing is vast, however, the 
underlying mechanisms are still contested. Wearden, O’Donoghue, Ogden, and 
Montgomery (2014) debated whether retrospective duration estimates actually increase 
due to “more information processing” (p. 293), in part because it remains a challenge to 
objectively define the meaning of information processing. Wearden and colleagues 
further added that “The role of external time markers in people’s judgments of passage of 
time […] is an under-researched area” (p. 303). The current research aims to evaluate the 
effectiveness of orienting individuals to environmental changes in modifying temporal 
estimates. 
4. Timing as attending to relevant, environmental change 
 Much of the literature reviewed thus far has been a cognitive account for 
attending as a mechanism for perceiving time. Most of their explanations of timing 
involve measuring behaviors as indicators for hypothetical constructs and models (e.g., 
accumulation of pulses that are process in an internal clock). Behavioral perspectives 
typically reject these postulates, however, as stated previously, there is considerable value 
in acknowledging the wealth of data that has been produced. Philosophical disputes aside, 
targeting attention as a functional variable for timing appears to be valuable.  
The next empirical step is to determine which contextual changes for which 
durations have the greatest effect on timing accuracy and variability. Brown (1995), who 
has based much of his empirical work from Poytner’s change/segmentation model of 
timing (i.e., the position that we tell time via sequences of changing events), conducted 
studies that would test systematic environmental change as a mechanism for timing. For 
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example, he found that “the influence of speed may be moderated by stimulus duration” 
(p. 113), and that there were four consistent patterns in his studies:  
(1) stimulus motion lengthened perceived time; (2) faster speeds generally 
lengthened perceived time to a greater degree than slower speeds; (3) the time 
judgments for both stationary and moving stimuli conformed to Vierordt’s law; 
and (4) the number of stimulus elements had only a limited influence on time 
judgments (p. 113).  
In sum, his findings suggest that the number or the degree of complexity of stimuli are 
less significant than their relative change that seems to have an impact on how 
individuals estimate the passage of time. 
Brown (1995) addressed the importance of context in timing, but there is still the 
missing element of stimulus and behavioral functions. He stated that his studies 
maintained experimental control by keeping the visual stimuli as functionally neutral. 
What is left unanswered is “If, however, the intervals contain a richer set of temporal 
cues in the form of changing stimulus events, the effects of number or size may diminish 
in importance” (p. 114). While Brown acknowledged contextual factors, they were 
primarily topographical. Quantity, size, and magnitude are all relational paradigms which 
gain or lose salience depending on what it’s describing. A “richer set of temporal cues” 
may greatly alter time judgments in different directions depending on whether those cues 
are appetitive or aversive (p. 114). This point nicely sums up the opportunity for a 
behavior analytic approach to timing. Taking the strengths of the existing literature on 
attending and manipulating context, behavior analysts may produce helpful results 
regarding the stimulus functions of the changing environmental stimuli.  
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As final critique of the attention literature, the potential lack for generalizability 
of results is troubling. Most of the studies limit their intervals and durations to just a few 
seconds (Brown, 1997; Dormal et al., 2006; Fortin, 1999). For example, Brown (1995) 
found that the longer durations produced more inconsistent results. In this case the 
“longer durations” meant 15 and 18 seconds. It would be difficult to make predictions for 
durations of a minute or longer. Given that there has been extensive debate about scalar 
properties of timing among psychophysicists and the lack of empirical work done with 
longer periods of time in the cognitive literature, understanding how humans track time 
over longer durations is still unclear. The current research pertains only to longer 
durations that fit more closely with how complex human activity operates (i.e., at the 
level of minutes, not seconds and milliseconds). 
B. Timing in behavior analysis 
 To say that behavior analysis as a field has been empirically silent on the topic of 
time would be a mistake. It would be equally flawed, however, to portray this work as 
equally visible as the literature presented thus far. The following sections will provide a 
representative sample of behavior analytic studies on time and timing, while introducing 
areas where the field can bolster the weaknesses mentioned in the previous section. In 
advocating for a more systemic exploration of time, all perspectives stand to benefit.  
 Historically, behavior analysts have held very particular views on time, perhaps 
more pronounced than in other psychological domains. Differentiating themselves from 
areas like developmental psychology, behaviorists embraced the position that events 
happen in time not because of time. Nevertheless, with Skinner’s investigation of various 
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reinforcement schedules (i.e., ratio, interval, time) and work on interresponse times with 
Sidman avoidance (Anger, 1963), behavior analysts have had to reconcile that what we 
traditionally call “time” is powerfully linked in the organism’s interaction with its 
environment. 
 Time and timing have been an integral aspect of early behavior analytic research. 
Skinner’s work on interval schedules proved interesting, particularly as it pertained to the 
various behavioral patterns that emerged under different contingencies involving time 
(Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Observing distinct behavioral patterns emerge from time-
based schedules was an early fascination (e.g., Anger, 1956) and were considered 
established phenomena by the late 1970’s (Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, & Sagvolden, 
1977; Rachlin & Burkhard, 1978). The data produced from interval schedules became 
interesting since they greatly differed on several levels: interval versus ratio schedules 
(Matthews et al., 1977; Zuriff, 1970), fixed-interval versus variable-interval schedules 
(Catania & Reynolds, 1968), humans versus non-human animals on interval schedules 
(Lowe, Harzem, & Hughes, 1978; Lowe, Beasty, & Bentall, 1983). 
1. Fixed-interval versus variable-interval schedules 
In Schedules of Reinforcement (1957), Ferster and Skinner provided an elaborate 
account of fixed and variable interval schedules, providing hundreds of pages of 
cumulative records to inspect. Their primary focus was on animal models due to the 
availability and facility of data collection. Animal studies often detected the typical 
scallop pattern using a fixed-interval (FI) schedule (Skinner & Morse, 1957). The 
variable interval (VI) schedule, conversely, produced different patterns. According to 
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Ferster and Skinner (1957) “The VI schedule is designed to produce a constant rate by 
not permitting any feature of the [organism’s] behavior to acquire discriminative 
properties. In contrast, in fixed-interval and fixed-ratio schedules the fixed pattern 
establishes a correlation between behavior and reinforcement” (p. 326). Thus, it was 
commonly observed that animals would steadily respond at high rates, unless the 
schedule was specifically programmed to produce reinforcers contingent with low rates 
of responding (i.g., DRL). 
Not only do patterns of responding change between FI and VI schedules, but 
research also demonstrated that organisms prefer VI over FI schedules when given the 
choice (Herrnstein, 1964). This preference is so replicable that subsequent research 
emerged to titrate VI schedules to find a model for creating equal preference between an 
FI and a VI (Killeen, 1968). These studies were the early discussions about how animal 
models on VI schedules were comparable to gambling behavior, and later would be 
useful for delay discounting research. 
2. Variable-ratio versus variable-interval schedules 
It has been long established that interval schedules produce different response 
patterns than ratio schedules. Ratio schedules, in which responding is directly linked to 
the reinforcing outcome which typically results in steady, rapid responding. Conversely, 
interval schedules can occasion any number of patterns and have noted lower rates 
(relative to ratio schedules) of responding that may occur in VI schedules (Zuriff, 1970). 
Initially, early behaviorists explained the lower rate of responding on a VI schedule as the 
reinforcement of long interresponse times (IRTs) “because the mere passage of time leads 
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to an increase in the probability of reinforcement” (Cole, 1999). Learning to adjust rate of 
responding “based on environmental stimulus changes” led to the acceptance of the term 
“temporal discrimination” (Anger, 1963, p. 478). For example, Douglas Anger, a student 
of B. F. Skinner, published findings from his dissertation regarding the selection and 
shaping of IRTs under varying conditions (Anger, 1956). Another more contemporary 
view explained that rates of responding change based on the degree to which it directly 
relates with the rate of reinforcement, and as Cole (1999) pointed out that for VI 
schedules “there is virtually no relation between rate of response and rate of 
reinforcement, except at very low rates of response” (p. 320). This latter viewpoint has 
been described as “molar” (Baum, 1973).  
The molar perspective originated from papers on measuring behavior as time 
allocation, rather than rates of behavior. Based on the theoretical paper by Rachlin and 
Burkhard (1978), the authors concluded that “Temporal distributions of behavior over 
fairly long periods are lawful regardless of the individual behavioral episodes (discrete 
responses, interresponse times, response bursts, neural events, muscle twitches, and so 
on) of which they are composed” (p. 44). In this paper, the authors evaluated behavior 
based on substitutability, or time allocation, rather than the more traditional dependent 
variables (e.g., rate of responding). From their position, time served as a constrained 
context in which n number of events may transpire. Engaging in one activity, such as an 
instrumental response (e.g., lever press), removes the possibility that the individual can 
engage in another behavior, like a contingent response (e.g., eating). Framing behavior as 
time allocation is a potentially viable approach for evaluating patterns of timing behavior. 
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3. Human versus non-human reactions to interval schedules 
The final significant observation with interval schedules was the difference 
between human and non-human response patterns. Quite possibly, this body of work is 
the earliest empirical demonstration of behavioral differences in verbal versus nonverbal 
organisms in behavior analysis. Early on, behavior analysts have heavily relied on animal 
models for identifying principles of behavior and early FI studies done with humans 
reported scalloping (see Hyten & Madden (1993) for a comprehensive historical account 
of FI schedules with humans). According to Hyten and Madden (1993), FI studies in the 
1950’s claimed that scalloping occurred across species, and some researchers reported 
scalloping with humans.  
A decade later, in the mid 1960’s, researchers started providing contradictory 
findings, that humans very rarely produced scalloping, and then only under specific 
condition. In 1969, Weiner’s study described the two, now commonly accepted, patterns 
generally produced by human subjects on FI schedules: “high and relatively constant 
response rates without post-reinforcement pauses (hereafter referred to as the high-rate 
performance); and lower response rates with post-reinforcement pauses (hereafter 
referred to as the low-rate performance)” (p.350). Hyten and Madden (1993) suggested 
that the delayed emergence of these behavioral differences between animals and humans 
was due to imprecise descriptions of cumulative records. 
There were multiple proposals for why there would be a different pattern of 
responding between humans and animals. Weiner (1969) mentioned that the low rate of 
behavior and pausing was “contingent upon the conditioning history of subjects and 
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response cost conditions, rather than the FI schedule per se” (p. 371-372). Later still, 
Lowe and his colleagues (Bentall & Lowe, 1987; Bentall, Lowe, & Beasty, 1985; Lowe 
et al., 1983) would be some of the first to produce findings that suggested these observed 
differences between animals and humans were due to the development of verbal 
behavior. 
4. Time and avoidance procedures 
 Much has been learned about behavior patterns with respect to positive 
reinforcement contingencies, but an equally significant contribution to behavioral 
perspectives on time comes from the avoidance literature. Just as organisms engage in 
behaviors in a temporal contingency in “anticipation” of a reinforcer, organisms will also 
respond to avoid an impending punisher. As Sidman (1953) succinctly described the 
three accepted aspects of avoidance conditioning: 
(a) The avoidance response (Rav) is never paired with the noxious stimulus. (b) 
All nonavoidance behavior is capable of producing the noxious stimulus and 
acquiring aversive properties, (c) Rav is strengthened when it terminates 
exteroceptive stimulation and/or nonavoidance behavior which has become 
aversive through pairings with the noxious stimulus (p. 253). 
What fascinated early scientists like Murray Sidman about un-signaled avoidance was 
that there was no programmed environmental stimulation to which the individual could 
respond. As he put it, the only event that could have aided the subject in successfully 
delaying the onset of the shock “was the nonavoidance behavior which has previously 
been paired with shock, and the termination of this behavior presumably provided the 
reinforcement for Rav” (p. 253). Put in another way, successful avoidance behavior 
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assumes that “behavior can be conditioned to certain unidentified organism events that 
change in a consistent way with time” (Anger, 1963; p. 479).  
 Tracking the nonavoidance behavior as a source for temporal discrimination fits 
well with the assumption that time is simply a measure of change. It also fits within more 
contemporary behavioral timing theories (e.g., BeT; Fetterman & Killeen, 1988). 
Behavior analysts have not escaped the issues surrounding defining time and temporal 
responding. Anger (1963) proposed conditioned aversive temporal stimuli (CATS) as a 
helpful analytical alternative to only looking at the responses, as Sidman suggested. 
Anger described temporal stimuli as “the internal events, whatever they are, that provide 
the basis for temporal discrimination” (p. 479). Later in the paragraph, he explained that 
he did not necessarily view time as a stimulus or as the stimulus as possessing any 
temporal qualities, but he did not clearly discuss that the individual’s behavior acquires 
stimulus functions that increase the effectiveness of tracking time (in this case, the 
change is the timer set to release a programmed shock).  
 Overall, reviewing the rich history of analyzing behavior with respect to time-
constrained contingencies demonstrates that (1) lawful behavioral patterns emerge under 
timed conditions, (2) behavioral principles facilitate the prediction and control over 
behavior under timed conditions, and (3) no hypothetical entities need to be introduced to 
explain these phenomena. It would be naïve to propose that behavior analysis has 
exhausted the possibilities in timing research, or that the strong history of studying 
interval schedules competes with the findings in the timing research in other disciplines. 
In the interest of supporting a systemic development of timing research, scientists could 
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do better to use the strengths from multiple areas to produce new and exciting findings on 
time and timing. 
C. The gaps and future of timing research 
 Undoubtedly, timing research has flourished over the past century, however, there 
is still much work to be done. Scientists still have little understanding regarding the 
functions of timing repertoires in a way that would be of some pragmatic use for 
application. Rarely, the well-controlled laboratory studies dominate the literature 
acknowledge the social significance or pragmatic value of their findings. Much of the 
research reviewed above represents the highly-replicable findings on timing behavior for 
brief periods of time (i.e., one minute or less). Furthermore, most of the literature has 
focused on how to measure and predict timing behavior with very few researchers 
studying how the behaviors involved in timing are shaped to begin with. As Costall 
(1984) noted about Gibson’s perspective on research, “How people cope with the bizarre 
situations dreamt up in most psychological laboratories is quite explicitly outside the 
scope of ecological theory” (p. 114). If one’s analytic goal as a scientist is to generate a 
greater understanding of behavior as it occurs in natural environments, external validity 
should be a priority.  
 In the next section, the conversation turns to the role of language in developing 
timing repertoires. Perhaps due to the strong tradition of producing timing studies in 
animal laboratories, verbal behavior was not considered to be a pertinent factor. 
Unfortunately, as the timing research matured and developed its own corner of 
psychological study, a giant scientific basis for language and its impact on human 
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behavior was growing in another. Building a program of research that would combine 
these two enormous domains would build a new avenue for productive research for both 
sides with all varieties of analytic goals. 
IV. Verbal Behavior and Timing 
Regardless of one’s philosophical premises or approaches to time, language is 
rarely addressed as a relevant factor for timing behavior. As Wearden (2008) pointed out, 
“although time perception research has made significant progress in the last 20 or 30 
years, many problems remain, and for present purposes, a particular difficulty is that 
hardly any of the research relates clearly to language” (p. 167). Neglecting to include 
language as a factor in the timing behaviors of verbal humans an enormous barrier to the 
generalizability and applicability of most timing research. 
Timing research is not the only area that has neglected to account for verbal 
repertoires. Despite its face validity and growing empirical basis, verbal behavior is 
undervalued in multiple research domains. S.C. Hayes and Berens (2004) considered the 
entire behavior analytic spectrum to be deficient in dealing with verbal behavior in that 
basic researchers do not have “the preparations and principles needed to research and 
understand human language” nor do applied behavior analysts have “the analytic tools 
needed to venture into the many domains of complex human behavior that seem to 
require such principles” (Hayes & Berens, 2004, p. 344). It can be argued that since 2004 
there has been a surge in research systematically investigating verbal behavior in of itself 
and as it applies to other repertoires; but more work remains to be done. 
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A. Current discussions of time and language 
Although the timing literature lacks much empirical work on verbal behavior, 
scientists have acknowledged that language serves an important role (consult Killeen & 
Weiss (1987) and Laties & Weiss (1963) for discussions of counting and interval 
schedules). Typically, when verbal behavior comes up in a timing article, the authors call 
attention to language in the discussion section with scant commentary on how to proceed. 
They are right to address the issue, like Fortin and Massé (2000) discussing the 
interference effect, they state “The level of expectation [in programmed pauses] was also 
likely to be increased with verbal instructions: Human participants expect a break when 
they are told that it will occur” (p. 1795). Authors should not be admonished for failing to 
suggest a research agenda that includes verbal repertoires. It is likely that those who 
sympathize with this weakness in the timing literature are also under the impression that 
there currently exists no functional framework for accounting for language scientifically. 
Clearly timing repertoires do not require verbal behavior. As Wearden (2008) put 
it, “Language is certainly not necessary for organisms to show sensitivity to the temporal 
structure of their environment” (p. 149). Nevertheless, the argument for including verbal 
behavior in the analysis of human timing is powerful. For verbal organisms, language is 
both pervasive and intrusive into nonverbal domains (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 
2001; p. 48). Pervasiveness suggests that verbal humans constantly engage in verbal 
behavior in almost all places, at all times. Since verbal behavior cannot be removed from 
timing repertoires, then scientists should consider them as an integral part of the 
phenomenon. In a similar way, Hayes and colleagues discussed how verbal behavior 
intrudes into nonverbal actions, just like Fortin and Massé (2000) described the human 
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studies on the interference effect. Although there are nonverbal aspects of timing, it is 
undeniable that language interacts with the nonverbal, nonarbitrary change in the 
environment.  
In the following sub-sections, the discussion will (1) review the empirical timing 
work that includes language in some substantive part of the analysis, (2) introduce 
relational frame theory (RFT) as a suitable framework for discussing language 
scientifically empirically, and (3) provide suggestions on how RFT could be used to 
expand upon the existing timing literature.  
1. Time and language during childhood 
One could speculate that the only reason human species have developed a concept 
for time at all is due to verbal behavior. Reflecting upon past events and planning for the 
future, appear to be exclusively human activities. As mentioned previously, Lowe and 
colleagues were some of the first to discuss verbal behavior as interacting with 
performance under interval schedules. Almost 40 years prior to this dissertation, Lowe, 
Harzem, and Hughes (1978) supposed that humans behaved differently on FI schedules 
because “in human experiments the subject’s behaviour is not under the control of 
experimental variables but is controlled by self-produced cues, which vary from subject 
to subject” (p. 384). Their studies focused on language as a relevant variable, and 
demonstrated differences in human performance on FI schedules before and after human 
children become verbal. 
Others since then have looked at how developmental factors (e.g., age, cognitive 
development) relate to the development of timing repertoires. Language, however, is not 
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commonly cited as a relevant factor in of itself. For example, Droit-Volet and Wearden 
(2001) conducted research with young children to test timing sensitivity in a traditional 
bi-section procedure. They noted multiple significant findings on increased timing 
sensitivity with increased age, with the interpretation that older children have more 
developed reference memory (p. 157). Although it was not discussed, language skills are 
developing simultaneously with physiological development and could potentially be a 
viable avenue for investigation. 
Gaucher, Forget, and Clément (2015) recently conducted a study on children 
between the ages of 2.6 and 7 years old to investigate potential variables responsible for 
temporal regulation. Gaucher and colleagues correlated language skills with mean 
proportion of reinforced responses on two different differential reinforcement of low-rate 
(DRL) schedules. Consistent with the results from Lowe’s work, the better timing 
performance was positively correlated with age. Language ability, which was measured 
through a validated test called the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (4th ed.), was not 
significantly correlated with the degree of effectiveness of the DRL on the participant’s 
timing behavior. Future research could dig into these findings further. If age is 
significantly correlated with timing, it is still reasonable to assume that some skill has 
developed that facilitated better timing performance. Null findings in this study do not 
mean that language is not affecting how humans time. With other methodologies that test 
language as a behavior, rather than producing a score from a single test, could potentially 
reveal more robust findings on how timing repertoires develop. 
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Some research has been done to extend the findings of Lowe et al. (1978) such as 
Baxter and Schlinger’s work with children on multiple schedules (1990). During the 12-
year gap between these articles, there has been significant contributions to the behavior 
analytic discussions on verbal behavior. Baxter and Schlinger addressed the possibility 
that multiple schedule performance with verbal individuals may be “rule governed” but 
their findings with pre-verbal and verbal children showed similar results to animal 
models. Baxter and Schlinger’s binary description of verbal/nonverbal introduces an 
interesting issue. Just because an individual demonstrates a verbal repertoire does not 
mean that it has developed enough to engage in all forms of verbal behavior. Levin, 
Wilkening, and Dembo (1984) showed that at around age 10 effective chronometric 
timing and timing rules emerge in response to a continuous timing task. Furthermore, 
verbal timing accuracy generally improved at seven years of age. Given that the oldest 
participant in Baxter and Schlinger (1990) was four and a half, it makes sense that the 
participants’ timing behavior continued to resemble nonverbal timing patterns. Verbal 
repertoires must develop over time to form complex rules regarding temporal relations. 
As will be discussed in future sections, rule governance undeniably impacts responding 
in schedules, however it is less clear how an individual might start using rules to aid in 
temporal relations. 
2. Counting as verbal temporal stimuli 
Most human timing literature has focused on humans who already have an 
extensive verbal repertoire. As adults, timing can no longer be investigated as it develops 
with the acquisition of language skills, but there is some work that has looked at how 
using language can impact timing accuracy. Although language from a functional, 
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behavioral account has not been considered in timing research, other investigators have 
included verbal processes as a mediator for timing accuracy. 
Verbal humans can enhance their timing abilities by chronometric counting (e.g., 
one-one-thousand, two-one-thousand) or by emitting some other behavioral pattern of a 
known length (e.g., singing). Chronometric timing is a common variable in studies 
investigating timing accuracy in humans. Not surprisingly, many articles mention how 
counting substantially increases the accuracy of one’s time keeping (Gaudreault & Fortin, 
2013; Grondin et al., 1999; Killeen & Weiss, 1987). In fact, Grondin and colleagues 
(1999) found that counting becomes effective starting at durations of 2.5 seconds. Any 
shorter, and explicit counting does not seem to help. What would be interesting, but 
remains to be seen, is the point at which counting stops being effective for long durations. 
Thinking about the scalability of timing, little has been said about durations lasting more 
than a few seconds, let along intervals of a minute or longer. It would make sense that 
counting seconds would lose efficacy for longer durations, but that counting sustained 
events (e.g., number of songs played, number of TV episodes watched) would be a 
related behavior that could effectively track long periods of time. 
Another finding in Wilkening, Levin, and Druyan (1987) was that children 
performed much more reliably in their counting behavior when accompanied by rhythmic 
beats. Considering the amount of training musicians get on rhythm and “keeping time,” it 
stands to reason that musicians would have a more developed skillset for tracking time. 
For example, Grondin and Killeen (2009) conducted a study wherein participants were 
asked to reproduce a sound for the same duration as was played to them. There were 
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several conditions where participants were told to count, sing a well-known tune, or do 
nothing. Additionally, eight of the 20 participants had extensive musical training. The 
results revealed that both counting and singing for both musicians and non-musicians 
significantly increased their timing accuracy. Furthermore, while singing or counting 
individuals with formal musical training produced near perfect reproductions which was 
a significant difference from the non-musician group, with decreasing variability as 
stimulus durations increased.  
Grondin and Killeen’s study not only supports the clear effects of counting and 
singing for tracking time, but also indicates that there are certain conditions under which 
human timing violated the stricter models of scalar timing (p. 1653). The authors did not 
explicitly suggest methods to improve timing. Their data supported that timing was 
learned and that individuals with particular learning histories could track time differently 
than what general psychophysics models predict. Finally, they discussed counting and 
timing as “mediators” but did not explicitly call attention to these behaviors as verbal, or 
functioning in anyway besides serving as collateral behavior (Bruner & Revusky, 1961). 
Such a point is valuable, but it limits the reader from considering anything further about 
the significance of verbal behavior on timing, such as instructional control and rule 
governance. 
Surprisingly, from the studies that have investigated verbal mediation as it relates 
to timing skills, the authors usually did not discuss functional impacts of verbal behavior. 
This could be due to a few factors. First, language is not often discussed or measured as a 
behavioral repertoire outside of behavior analysis. Rather it is often used as an indirect 
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measure for something else. Second, some researchers have questioned whether using 
language for counting is timing. In fact, Grondin, Meilleur-Wells, and Lachance (1999) 
dedicated a whole section of their discussion to whether counting could be considered 
timing (p. 1001). The authors distinguished between “number processing” and 
“counting,” using animal models to compare with human timing. The rhetoric revolved 
around cognitive processes wherein the answer was attempted based on assumed internal 
clock mechanisms in that “Number and time information received from their respective 
accumulator would be placed at different sites in working memory” (p. 1002).  
A behavioral perspective would take a different approach to Grondin and 
colleagues’ discussion by evaluating the function of the behavior in question. Counting 
ordinally and counting chronometrically (i.e., with a regular rhythm) function differently 
on time tracking, as seen in Wilkening, Levin, and Druyan (1987). Thus, in taking a 
behavioral perspective on timing research utilizing counting strategies, there is a sizeable 
gap in our knowledge of timing. By looking at language as a measurable, shapeable 
behavior in relation to functional timing, new programs of timing studies could begin to 
answer research questions with greater external validity and pragmatic value. 
B. A functional account of language and timing 
Thus far, it has been established that certain forms of verbal behavior effectively 
mediates timing responses. What remains to be seen are the various stimulus functions 
verbal behavior has on timing beyond serving as collateral behavior, that is, the other 
behavior that occurs that is not responsible for producing reinforcement. Furthermore, to 
repeat a theme throughout this manuscript, there is a need for timing research that can 
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help others perform more effectively in their natural environments. The subject area has 
been saturated with conversations about mental mechanisms and perfecting processes, 
which suggests that this area of research may be ready to expand into a more pragmatic 
domain. 
Behavior analysis has the tools to lead the expansion. As S.C. Hayes and L.J. 
Hayes (1989) point out “Behavioral perspectives should be well positioned 
philosophically to address the nature of verbal stimulation in a naturalistic manner” (p. 
161). Admittedly, empirical work on verbal behavior has been latent compared to when it 
first became a topic for theoretical discussion. At the time, B.F. Skinner’s Verbal 
Behavior (1957) provided a provocative analysis on how verbal behavior could be 
operationalized and studied functionally. Except for providing training in applied 
behavior analysis on tacts and mands, “a Skinnerian perspective has limited the nature 
and the scope of its investigation [of verbal events]” (S.C. Hayes & L.J. Hayes, 1989; p. 
161). Several behavioral perspectives on language have since emerged, but none have 
produced the volume of theoretical and empirical work as Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT). 
The following subsections briefly review RFT, specifically as it pertains to 
framing and rule governance, to suggest a new area for timing research. Visible critiques 
and defenses of RFT have already been published (Dymond, May, Munnelly, & Hoon, 
2010; S.C. Hayes, 2004; Palmer, 2004), thus the conversation below will not do so. 
Choosing the RFT perspective resulted from there being no other theoretical account of 
language that (1) analyzes language as behavior, (2) with validated explanations for 
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verbal behaviors acquiring stimulus functions as relational events, (3) which also 
provides a framework for studying verbal behavior as an observable behavioral event, 
without inferring a mental model. 
1. Using Relational Frame Theory (RFT) to analyze verbal timing 
In 2001, S.C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche published Relational Frame 
Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition which 
synthesized and formalized several decades of fastidious theoretical and empirical 
research. As the title implies, RFT aimed to transcend the experimental barriers of 
Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, and provide a functional and naturalistic account of verbal 
behavior. RFT largely relies on the premise that “deriving stimulus relations is learned 
behavior” (S. C. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, p. 22). From this, the authors 
present data which support that “derived relational responding is a form of generalized 
operant behavior” (p. 43), or as S.C. Hayes proposed nine years earlier, “relating as an 
action can become abstracted and brought under contextual control” (S.C. Hayes, 1992, 
p. 110). 
Since then, many behavior analysts interested in verbal behavior have found RFT 
as a launching point for developing their own programs of research. As S.C. Hayes and 
Berens (2004) described, “To the extent that RFT is successful, behavior analysis itself 
will change, and do so in a fairly dramatic way” (p. 346-347). In their discussion, Hayes 
and Berens explained that so much of the work done in behavior analysis has not 
considered the additive impact of verbal behavior on nonverbal process, leaving the field 
with incomplete analyses. That is certainly the case with timing research. 
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The theoretical work on RFT mentions time and timing issues periodically 
because it is an excellent example of how arbitrarily applicable relational responding 
(i.e., verbal behavior) interacts with the nonarbitrary world (i.e., time as natural events 
transpiring). For example, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche (2001) stated: 
Nonverbal events occur in nonverbal time. Sequences are nonarbitrary—they are 
experienced directly. The only future that is known is the past that has been 
experienced. Verbal organisms turn time on its head. The past is continuously 
verbally reconstructed as various stories about it are generated and adopted. The 
future is imagined (p. 48). 
Early RFT literature readily acknowledged that timing is influenced by both physical 
stimuli (i.e., nonarbitrary) and verbal stimuli (i.e., arbitrary). This is an important first 
step to conceptualizing timing while accounting for verbal behavior because it accepts the 
historical models and data built from nonverbal timing models. The significance of 
investigating verbal behavior in relation to time is taking what we already know about 
time and add a level of complexity that the field is now poised to address. The benefit of 
doing so would help both those with basic or applied ambitions: “RFT research seems 
likely to make applied behavior analysis a more basic endeavor, and make the 
experimental analysis of behavior more dependent on applied results” (Hayes & Berens, 
2004; p. 351). 
2. Relational framing temporal events 
Similar to the classical philosophers Leibniz and Kant, RFT takes a similar 
position of relativity. Not surprisingly, the heart of RFT is the act of “framing 
relationally” which was described by S.C. Hayes (1992) as “an act with a history” (p. 
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114). Even the principle phenomenon of RFT relies on the importance of time as 
changing events. Hayes continues that relationally framing is: 
not with regard to the relatae [sic] so much as it is with regard to the relating [...] 
that is, based on a history of deriving temporal sequences among events (the 
“past”), the organism is responding in the present by constructing a sequential 
relation between at least two events (p. 114). 
We learn to associate arbitrary stimuli with the nonarbitrary stimuli based on a history of 
the two coexisting reliably. Furthermore, we can compare those stimuli and events to 
others through relations. Including relations in analyzing verbal behavior stand in contrast 
with traditional approaches like stimulus equivalence (Blakely & Schlinger, 1987). With 
the former, researchers can begin to explore how we compare verbal events to each other 
in addition to investigating how verbal responses are acquired in of themselves. 
The RFT literature describes multiple types of relational frames, the two most 
relevant for timing as frames of coordination and comparison. Described as the “most 
fundamental type of relational responding,” S.C. Hayes and L.J. Hayes (1989) discuss a 
frame of coordination as “one of identity, sameness, or similarity” wherein “the more 
sameness between two stimuli (in an arbitrary sense), the greater the range of function 
that can be derived between participants in this relation” (p. 172). Frames of coordination 
would be integral to identifying temporal similarity between events which could help 
with generalizing timing estimates or for noticing temporal patterns. For example, one 
might notice that it takes about the same amount of time to pack a lunch as it does to 
scrape off an icy windshield before work. If running late, a person may forego lunch 
packing in exchange for de-icing the car to get to work on time. Or in terms of patterns, 
one might notice that their “getting ready” routine takes 90 minutes on Monday, 85 
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minutes on Tuesday, 95 minutes on Wednesday, etc. Each of those temporal events share 
sameness in that the same preparation activities take a similar amount of time on a 
standardized clock. Establishing a frame of coordination around daily “getting ready” 
routines with an hour and a half serves as a basis for other verbal behavior, such as rule 
generation (e.g., saying “If I want to get to work by 9:00 A.M., I will need to get up at 
7:30 A.M.).  
Another helpful frame for verbal timing is the frame of comparison. Comparison 
frames are common, like coordination frames, as they are “involved whenever one event 
is responded to in terms of a known nonequal and nonopposite quantitative or qualitative 
relation along a specified dimension with another event” (S.C. Hayes & L.J. Hayes, 1989, 
p. 173). A whole body of research could be dedicated to the establishment of frames of 
comparison with timing. Learning that writing a final term paper takes significantly 
longer than the work hours available over a weekend is a helpful lesson that many people 
learn through experiencing the direct, nonarbitrary consequences of pulling all-nighters 
or handing in a late paper. Or recognizing that 90 minutes to get ready in the morning is 
not the same as the elapsed time between waking up and stepping into the office. By not 
including transit and walking time into the verbal estimate, not to mention what happens 
when you can’t find your keys right away, many people find it challenging to arrive 
punctually. It is possible, if not likely, that developing a verbal repertoire to include 
timing comparisons, in conjunction with attending the relevant events for temporal 




To apply these terms to a larger example of acquiring verbal timing skills, one 
might think about how a child learns about temporal intervals through verbal and 
nonverbal experiences. As mentioned previously, before a certain age, young children 
have little understanding of continuous and overlapping intervals (Levin et al., 1984). 
When a child asks how much longer a car ride will be, a parent could say “five hours” or 
“five minutes” and get a similar distressed sigh from the inquisitor. It is not until later 
that a frame of coordination builds around time words and the nonarbitrary events that 
transpire reliably with those words. So when the child asks during the car ride how much 
farther to Grandma’s house, a parent might say “two and a half hours” or in some cases 
“two Sesame Streets and a Barney.” In this case, the number of episodes of the child’s 
preferred television shows (i.e., the nonarbitrary events that transpire) coordinate with the 
duration of the trip to Grandma’s house which coordinates with the descriptive phrase 
“two and a half hours.”  
Comparison frames are also developing in the road trip example. One episode of 
Sesame Street runs for 60 minutes whereas Barney and Friends is only 30 minutes. It 
takes no time at all for a child to learn the longer-shorter frame of comparison. Not only 
will children learn the shorter-longer comparison between television shows, but the 
relation will extend to differing durations in other contexts. Trips to Grandma’s may 
mean watching two Sesame Street episodes and one of Barney, but one only need wait for 
one Sesame Street before eating after visiting the dentist. Additionally, the durations can 
take on different stimulus functions based on what the longer duration describes (e.g., 
watching TV or sitting in a waiting room) as well as what awaits after the duration 
expires (e.g., playing with Grandma or bedtime).  
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Learning temporal relations creates unique challenges from other, less abstract 
contexts. As Hayes, Barnes-Homes, and Roche (2001) described them, “Temporal frames 
are more inherently verbal in that they are based on the nonarbitrary experience of 
change, but the dimensional nature of that experience must be verbally constructed” (p. 
39). It “must” be because humans developed the concept of time to begin with. Time as a 
verbal construct only exists in so far as we want to standardize it using common tools and 
language. Doing so is helpful, because it allows us to plan ahead, save for the future, or 
generally increase our effectiveness in a time-based society. 
Studying the various functions of verbal stimuli, beyond as discriminative stimuli 
or collateral behavior, provides the latitude to study behavior that occurs exclusively with 
humans. Phenomena like delay discounting has been studied with both verbal and 
nonverbal individuals, however no species can problem solve and behave with respect to 
extremely delayed (or even hypothetical) consequences. S.C. Hayes and L.J. Hayes 
(1989) explain how verbal behavior makes these extensive behavior patterns possible by 
“greatly reduc[ing] the number of events relevant to a given consequence, when the 
consequence is functioning verbally” (p. 185). Verbal behavior augments stimulus 
control over relevant change, based on the context. The number of events have been 
reduced because the individual learns to discriminate that “time” only pertains to certain 
events, not all events. The child on the way to Grandma’s will know that it is time to put 
socks and shoes on when the third show is finished, without having to count the mileage 
signs or for some internal signal that 90 minutes have passed.  
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S.C. Hayes and L.J. Hayes (1989) explained that by reducing the number relevant 
events to a consequence, there is less or no confusion when a remote consequence is 
delivered. In an earlier example with the icy windshield, if a person goes through the 
normal routine only to find out that they also have to spend an extra seven minutes 
scraping ice of the car windows, they can project that they will be late for work. Because 
the frames of coordination and comparison were parts of the person’s verbal network, the 
reprimand from the boss will be related to the extra prep time spent at home, not for the 
behavior of walking into the office. 
Little empirical work has been conducted on verbal behavior and temporal 
relations, and what does exist pertains to another dimension of timing relating to deictic 
relations. RFT refers to deictic relations to “specify a relation in terms of the perspective 
of the speaker” (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, p. 38). It is important to 
highlight that “Frames that depend on perspective, however, cannot be traced to formal 
dimensions in the environment at all” (p. 39). Relations like “now” and “not-now” (i.e., 
past, future, later, etc.) or “before” and “after” are entirely verbal events referring to event 
sequence. Reviewing the few studies that have addressed temporal relations is important 
for acknowledging that systematically evaluating temporal frames is possible and 
promising. However, readers should note that temporal sequencing is a different process 
than establishing coordination frames of event duration (i.e., timing estimates). 
O’Hora, Pelaez, & Barnes-Holmes (2005) conducted a study in which 74 
bilingual college students completed both a series of complex relational tasks and the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third Edition (WAIS-III). Among the relational tasks 
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included tests for temporal relations targeting the before-after relation, sequentially 
showing shapes on a computer screen. O’Hora and colleagues reported significant 
correlations between success on the relational tasks and performance on the WAIS-III. 
The participants’ before-after scores were significantly correlated with the vocabulary 
subtest (r = .34, p < .001) and the arithmetic subtest (r = .23, p < .001). While 
correlational results insufficiently describe causality, these results can be useful in 
demonstrating the utility of RFT as it relates behavioral analyses to mainstream 
psychological measures. The degree to which a mastery of temporal relations relates to 
measures of intelligence, however, remains unclear.  
A follow-up study done by O’Hora, Pelaez, Barnes-Holmes, and Rae (2008) 
replicated and extended their findings by running another 81 participants through the 
temporal relations task and the complete WAIS-III. Their results “showed that the ability 
to respond to temporal relations predicted performance on complex cognitive tasks” (p. 
577). Another temporal element was added to the 2008 discussion when using the entire 
WAIS-III in that it included indices on Working Memory and Processing Speed. The 
authors explained that since there were no time constraints on the relational task (i.e., 
testing the before-after relation), successfully passing the temporal relations task would 
not necessarily be indicative of those measures. The results supported that rationale.  
The two layers of temporality in this study serve as a good empirical example of 
nonarbitrary and arbitrary aspects of timing. The before-after relation is a verbal 
description of events (i.e., the appearance and disappearance of two different shapes in 
temporal relation to one another). That the event transpired is nonarbitrary, but the 
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describing of the event is abstracted. Similarly, completing a series of tasks within an 
allotted period is a separate temporal event from temporal relations. There is no 
immediate reason to believe that one skill would generalize to the other. Thus, 
investigating various timing repertoires with respect to arbitrary and nonarbitrary features 
is important for deepening our understanding of how verbal organisms acquire and shape 
timing skills.  
3. Rule-governance of timing behavior 
 The concept of rule-governance emerged to account for behavior that was not 
otherwise contingency-shaped. Since then, some have doubted whether rule-governed 
behavior is merely a form of contingency-shaped behavior. Reese (1989) somewhat 
unsatisfyingly distinguished the two in that contingency governance is “a [basic] function 
of contingent stimuli” and rule governance is “an acquired function” (p. 38). Twelve 
years later, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche (2001) provided a clearer distinction of 
rule governance: “Whenever a frame of coordination between two such [verbal] networks 
serves as a source of control over behavior, it seems to us that the behavior is 
meaningfully rule-governed” (p. 107). Such a definition provides clearer parameters for 
what distinguishes behavior as rule-governed and allows for a deeper analysis of rule 
functions (i.e., tracking, pliance, and augmenting) as well as rule source (i.e., imposed 
rules versus self-generated rules). 
  S.C. Hayes and L.J. Hayes (1989) also discussed what it means to follow a rule. 
They concluded that “what we would normally call nonverbal events can function 
verbally, based on their participation in relational classes. This transfer of the functions of 
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words to other events provides the basis for rule-following” (p. 181, emphasis in 
original). Identifying the interrelation of the nonarbitrary, nonverbal environment or 
behavior with verbal events is particularly important with time and timing. Based on the 
representative findings provided above, timing does not necessitate verbal behavior. But 
given the extension of behavioral patterns over long periods of time, it would require 
some mediating stimulus, like a rule, to maintain. As Haas and Hayes (2006) stated “In 
most human performance situations, the target behavior of interest is established at least 
in part through verbal rules, and verbal feedback includes feedback not just on task 
performance but also on the form of rule-governed behavior observed” (p. 94). 
Presumably, humans learn timing rules to more effectively interact with our natural and 
social surroundings, and contact reinforcement for successful rule following. Rules such 
as “wait 30 minutes after eating before swimming” or “count to 10 when you’re angry” 
articulate a negative reinforcement contingency wherein waiting before responding 
reduces the likelihood of aversive events.  
Instructional control. Within the literature on rule-governance, there has been an 
emphasis on instructions as verbal antecedents augmenting stimulus control. The obvious 
advantage of providing instructions to change behavior is that “following an instruction 
allows a previously established repertoire to contact reinforcement quickly without 
extensive exposure to the reinforcement contingency” (Joyce & Chase, 1990, p. 252). 
One of the most established effects of rule governance is the resulting insensitivity of 
behavior to contingency changes from instructions (Törneke, Luciano, & Salas, 2008). 
Instructions are adventitious because they signal specific, desired behaviors without a 
lengthy shaping process. Danforth, Chase, Dolan, and Joyce (1990) concluded that “The 
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instructional stimulus assisted in the acquisition of stimulus control” but was facilitated 
by a history of differential, nonverbal reinforcement (p. 101). Sometimes, it works too 
well, however, that instructions can decrease nonverbal sensitivity to direct-acting 
contingencies. This is problematic when considering the missed opportunities that result 
from incorrect rules either about ourselves our situations in which we live. 
For example, in S.C. Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb, and Korn (1986) a 
series of studies detailed the relative impact of instructions on effective responding with 
respect to a multiple schedule (fixed-ratio / differential reinforcement of low rate; 
FR/DRL). All the participants pressed a button on an apparatus for points, and different 
instructional conditions were applied for different groups of participants (i.e., minimal 
instruction, “Go fast”, “Go slow”, no instruction). They used a multiple schedule to be 
able to make “a direct comparison of contingency sensitivity produced by high-rate and 
low-rate instructions” (p. 240). The authors stated that “responding on the schedules was 
a joint product of current consequences of responding and instructional control. Without 
instruction, none of the subjects made extensive contact with both types of programmed 
consequences” (p. 240). Participants who received inaccurate instructions followed them, 
despite their inadequacy. And in one case, one of their participants “made contact with 
consequences that contradicted the rule specified by the instructions and yet still followed 
that rule” (p. 241). When the participants came under the more powerful (i.e., direct 
acting) contingency, instructions had less impact, and others found that if participant 
behavior came under the control of the nonverbal contingency, instructions had little to 
no effect (Torgrud & Holborn, 1990). Findings of insensitive responding in the presence 
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of instructions have also been shown elsewhere (Joyce & Chase, 1990; Shimoff, Catania, 
& Matthews, 1981). 
The article from Joyce and Chase (1990) also discussed the desensitization of 
rule-governed behavior, but then also demonstrated empirically that instructions can 
increase variability too. In their second experiment, Joyce and Chase included a set of 
strategic instructions that explained ratio and interval schedules, ending with: “The best 
way to figure out which system of point delivery is in effect is to vary your speed of 
responding until you reliably earn points with the least effort” (p. 257). Most participants 
doubled their efficiency after reading the strategic instruction for variability. Joyce and 
Chase’s findings support the conclusions of LeFrancois, Chase, and Joyce (1988) that 
“variety training” can create sensitivity to environmental changes.  
Even simple instructions are powerful enough to facilitate observation of one’s 
own behavioral patterns. Although there is no contingency manipulation in the 
dissertation studies described below, nor are there explicit consequences for the 
participants timing responses, the underlying assumption of the experiment is that 
different instructions function to reorient the individual to different events in the 
environment (i.e., the participant’s game playing behavior or their own breath).  
In sum, many studies have shown that instructions exert powerful control over 
responding, and they can be elaborated upon to produce variable responding (Chase & 
Bjarnadottir, 1992), or establish stimulus control over derived relations (O’Hora, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2004). The current research aimed to clarify what we know about 
timing accuracy and variability through nonarbitrary and arbitrary means. That is, the 
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degree to which, and under what conditions, verbal behavior with respect to timing 
relates to the direct experience of time through change in the environment. The existing 
literature on instructional control indicates that using instructions to restrict participants’ 
attention to various aspects of environmental change as a way of reducing timing 
variability at longer durations. Chase and Bjarnadottir (1992) state “if instructions are 
going to address this problem of variation, they have to tell the subject what behavior to 
vary, and under what conditions” (p. 192). If instructions can effectively lead a 
participant to vary their responding, it is likewise reasonable to assume that instructions 
can lead a participant to observe their own variable responding. Based on the 
philosophical position that timing means attending to changing events, the temporal 
characteristics of an interval are the qualities of the participant’s behavior pattern. 
Tracking. The functional process by which behavior is controlled by instructions 
is referred to, in the RFT literature, as “tracking.” Tracking has been defined as “rule-
governed behavior under the control of a history of correspondence between the rule and 
the way the world is arranged independently of the delivery of the rule” (S. C. Hayes, 
Gifford, & G. Hayes, 1998). According to Torneke and colleagues (2008), the simplest 
form of a track is one that specifies a direct contingency where the successful following 
of the rule will necessarily produce the nonarbitrary consequence (p. 149). This definition 
of tracking is usually followed by the common example of providing directions (e.g., 
getting to a bus stop).  
Verbal timing as it relates to the act of judging or estimating time duration also 
fits best with the concept of tracking. Tracking directly relies upon frames of 
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correspondence. Returning to the child in the car on the way to Grandma’s, the parents 
might say “We’ll be there in two and a half hours.” The description “two and a half 
hours” might have a history of correspondence with the quantity of relevant, successive 
events that can take place during that time, such as two Sesame Streets and a Barney. The 
complexity of a verbal construct like time is that the relevant events change depending on 
the context. When the child becomes adolescent, “two and a half hours” might start to 
correspond to the length of a basketball game, or the different acts in a theatrical 
performance. Or later still, “two and a half hours” might describe the time it takes to 
write two 500 word essays in an advanced placement exam in high school. Having a 
better understanding of how attending and verbal instructions interact to develop timing 
repertoires could support the idea of instructions as tracks for timing accuracy. If the rule 
instructs the individual to orient to the relevant changes in the environment to effectively 
estimate time duration, the rule would be considered a track, and the rule-governed 
behavior would be tracking. 
Unfortunately, most of the discussions on tracking have remained conceptual, so 
the examples and variations of functional tracking are limited. A recent review of the 
literature (Kissi et al., 2017), found only three empirical, peer-reviewed articles that 
explicitly identified “tracking” as a variable of interest (i.e., Baruch, Kanter, Busch, 
Richardson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2007; McAuliffe, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014; 
Zettle & Young, 1987). As a result, there are not many established procedures for 
investigating tracking as a process.  
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One of the main conclusions of Kissi and colleagues’ review (2017) was that 
terms describing functional forms of rules (i.e., tracking) should be considered 
“midlevel” terms, meaning they may be helpful for describing qualities of rules but are 
not precise enough to produce replicable effects. It could be that distinguishing between 
plies, tracks, and augmentals has not served much of a role in the basic studies 
establishing principles of verbal behavior. In broader contexts, however, the 
differentiations become more useful. In learning to talk about time and organize one’s 
behavior with respect to time, the concept of “tracking” is a helpful framework for 
discussing the interaction between nonarbitrary time (i.e., events transpiring) and 
arbitrary time (i.e., temporally framing). If the instructions function as a track, then in 
timing studies we would expect to see at least a reduction in timing estimation variability, 
if not also an increase in timing accuracy. As mentioned in the previous section on basic 
timing research, individuals become increasingly less accurate in their timing estimates as 
the temporal interval lengthens. Ignoring for the moment that those highly validated 
findings pertain almost exclusively to intervals of under one minute, the research also 
indicates that verbal behavior (often discussed as counting or having some form of verbal 
attending strategy) can improve timing. Tracking as a scientific, functional process could 
serve as the missing link in explaining the connection between timing awareness and 
language. 
Self-generated rules. It should be noted that rules can have multiple sources. 
Much of the rule-governance literature involves providing rules to the participants. 
However, there has been some work concerning rules developed by the participant 
through experiencing the experimental conditions. The literature often refers to this 
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phenomenon as self-generated rules. Self-generated rules function similarly as imposed 
rules. For example, research supports that for participants who experience either provided 
rules or self-generated rules respond more effectively and faster, and experience slower 
extinction patterns than participants who neither receive a rule or are asked to create one 
(Baumann, Abreu-Rodrigues, & Souza, 2009; Rosenfarb, Newland, Brannon, & Howey, 
1992).  
Since the development of Skinner’s radical behaviorism, behavioral philosophy 
does not preclude so-called “private events” like self-generated rules, and RFT similarly 
embraces these important events. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche (2001) specifically 
described how pragmatic verbal analysis works regardless of whose behavior is being 
observed. Additionally, they specify the potential benefits of developing a repertoire for 
self-observation: “Self-monitoring and self-awareness may permit greater self-control 
[…] In the case of problem-solving strategies, for example, responding to one’s responses 
may contribute to evaluating the success or failure of behavioral efforts” (p. 100). When 
considering timing repertoires, it can be argued that most of our rules regarding time and 
timing are self-generated based on our own experiences. Except for particular contexts 
(i.e., in cooking, recipes explicitly taught that rice is cooked after 20 to 30 minutes, or in 
music when the conductor or written notes indicate duration of playing behavior), rules 
about time are derived. Future studies may find self-generated rules a rich area for 
investigation in timing research.  
 Present moment awareness: Finally, reviewing verbal behavior from an RFT 
perspective as it relates to time would be remiss if it did not include “present moment 
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awareness” into the conversation. Arguably the most comprehensive and visible 
applications of RFT has been the traditionally psychotherapeutic intervention known as 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). ACT uses an RFT framework and aims to 
train psychological flexibility which is a model composed of six core processes: (a) 
cognitive defusion, (b) acceptance, (c) present-moment awareness, (d) self as context, (e) 
personally identified values, and (f) committed action (M. E. Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, 
& Hayes, 2012, p. 742). Part of ACT’s notoriety is due to both its breadth of 
effectiveness across physical and mental health problems and its efficacy (Powers, Zum 
Vörde Sive Vörding, & Emmelkamp, 2009), as well as improving work environments 
(Bond, S.C. Hayes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2006; Herbst & Houmanfar, 2009). In the recent 
meta-analysis done by Levin and colleagues (2012), they conducted a component 
analysis wherein the criteria for “present moment” included “instructing participants to 
actively attend to bodily sensations, thoughts, feeling, and/or other internal experiences in 
the present moment” (p. 747). From the studies they identified as evaluating the present 
moment process, synthesized results reveal significant, positive effects with medium 
effect sizes, suggesting that present moment focus alone is an active component to 
promote wellness and psychological flexibility. 
Focusing on the present is said to have therapeutic effects because it counteracts 
some of the tendencies as verbal humans to ruminate on the past or the future (Broderick, 
2005). The literature has acknowledged that verbal behavior is a significant contributor to 
psychopathology (S.C. Hayes, 1992; Torneke et al., 2008), under the premise that the 
very repertoire that gives humans the freedom to learn quickly from the past and plan for 
the future is the same repertoire that allows for anxiety, depression, shame, etc. In terms 
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of time, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche (2001) explained it this way: “based on a 
history of change (the ‘past’), the animal is responding to present events that have 
preceded change to other events. It is not the literal future to which the organism 
responds—it is the past as the future” (p. 113). Spending too much time responding to the 
past or future in the present can increase distress and decrease the likelihood of enjoying 
the moment.  
Two common approaches to testing present moment focus is by either mindful 
breathing exercises or some other instructions to monitor bodily sensations. Both 
techniques have been found to be effective at faster pain recovery (Cioffi & Holloway, 
1993), reducing dysphoric responses (Broderick, 2005), and increasing greater 
acceptance of repetitive thought (Feldman, Greeson, & Senville, 2010). By fostering 
present moment awareness, participants develop a repertoire for self-observation in the 
moment. Facilitating timing awareness may require a similar treatment, where effectively 
judging time duration requires actively attending to changes in the environment, which 
would include one’s own activity. What is unique about mindfulness training that 
concentrates on the present moment is that it is typically used as attending to events as a 
continuous flow, rather than discrete, countable events. Whether present moment 
instructions will influence timing accuracy or variability remains to be seen.  
4. Summary 
As S.C. Hayes and Berens (2004) noted, the next step is to “do the difficult work 
to understand exactly how direct contingencies are altered by verbal contingencies 
because without that knowledge we cannot safely and directly extend our principles of 
78 
 
behavior derived from non-human organisms to language able humans” (p. 349). The 
literature review presented a representative sample of the timing studies that have 
included language as a relevant behavior effecting timing accuracy, even if it was not 
explicitly stated. Overall, most of the existing time literature discussed rather than 
manipulated verbal stimuli or occasions verbal behavior. On the other side, the verbal 
behavior literature from an RFT perspective provides a sound theoretical and empirical 
framework for investigating the various influences verbal behavior has on verbal and 
nonverbal timing in humans. 
By bringing a rigorous research agenda of verbal behavior to the timing literature, 
the possibilities for future research could develop in ways that would benefit both 
domains. Not only would the basic research on time gain a new level of complexity to 
study (i.e., various frames and rules with respect to arbitrary and nonarbitrary time), but 
investigating time provides a unique context to explore and refine concepts proposed in 
RFT. The following studies are a step in the direction of setting these mutual benefits in 
motion, ending with a proposed study and a discussion about where the future of timing 
research could go. 
In sum, the provided review illuminated the wide array of knowledge that exists 
in two vastly important domains, time and verbal behavior, as well as demonstrating that 
there are empirical gaps that would explain how the two domains interrelate. Taking a 
functional analytic approach, the following studies begin to examine to what degree and 
under what conditions do verbal stimuli and verbal behavior augment the stimulus control 
over relevant change to track time.  
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The following section covers a series of three studies which took a basic 
methodology modified slightly in each to investigate timing behavior of three-minute 
intervals. The first study assessed the accuracy and variability of retrospective time 
estimates. The second study uses a modified free-operant procedure where the 
participants produced empty intervals of three-minutes by pressing a button, while being 
exposed to instructions to notice particular features of the participants’ environment.  The 
third study replicated the second study’s procedure with the addition of an initial three-
minute alarm as a discriminative stimulus. The primary aims of this research were: (a) to 
investigate the timing patterns produced for long durations multiple minutes over a 
sustained period of time as compared to similar studies for shorter durations, and (b) to 
identify conditions under which verbal antecedents and self-generated rules may impact 
timing in human participants. By researching longer durations and systematically 
evaluating the impacts of verbal behavior, these series of studies can begin to synthesize 
and add greater relevance of the timing literature to applied settings. 
V. Empirical Investigations 
 The following three studies adhered to the notion that timing behavior is shaped 
by the interaction of the behaving organism and changing environmental events. 
Furthermore, the words “time” and “timing” are used for heuristic value, however, the 
philosophical foundation upon which this research is based adopts the view that time is a 
metric used to measure relevant change. It is environmental changes, not time, that to 
which the individual attends.  
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Two different operant responses were required in the different studies: time 
estimates in Study 1, and interval production in Studies 2 and 3 (see Table 2 for a 
summary of study methods). For all studies, participants completed Sudoku puzzles for 
points and the target interval was three minutes. Each study is described and discussed 
individually and cross-study comparisons are made at the end. 
A. Study 1 
The first study evaluated the relative accuracy of timing estimates for long periods 
of time. As discussed earlier, a potential barrier for current timing research in being easily 
applied is that the intervals of interest are impractically short (e.g., 60 seconds or less). 
Notable timing researchers such as Grondin & Killeen (2009) have mentioned that "Not 
much is known about the variability of long-interval estimates by humans in simpler 
tasks” (p. 1653). One of the aims for this first study was to measure the individual 
differences in timing estimates and sensitivity to larger timing patterns at three minute 
fixed-time intervals.  
1. Method 
Participants, Setting, and Materials. For the first study, participants consisted of 
27 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Nevada, Reno recruited 
through the university’s psychology subject pool. We accepted all participants 18 years 
of age and older. By participating, individuals earned one credit through the subject pool 
which is often exchanged for extra credit in their psychology course. Additionally, 
participants were entered into a raffle for a $25 Visa gift card. Participating automatically 
gave each participant one ticket entry to the raffle, but they were told that better 
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performance in the game could win them extra tickets to increase their chances (see Table 
2 for point contingencies, and Appendix A for full point-to-ticket distribution 
breakdown). 
 The study took place in a lab room that would allow for the participant to be 
greeted and trained in an open meeting area and then be escorted to the back of the room 
to work the remainder of the session at a university-networked computer. All clocks, 
digital or otherwise, were removed or dismantled. Participants were required to remove 
any wristwatch or timing device on their person, and they were asked to put their phones 
on silent and leave in the meeting area. 
All participants, regardless of their familiarity with playing Sudoku were given 
instructions on how to play Sudoku, with a few strategy tips, and a sample Sudoku puzzle 
to complete. The puzzle matched the level of complexity of the puzzles in the computer 
program. Participants read the instructions on their own and then completed the puzzle. 
Research assistants did not assist, unless asked. Upon completion, research assistants 
checked for 100% accuracy and had the participants correct any errors. All training 
sessions were timed, and averaged 10.13 minutes (range 3 - 29). 
The program used for the Sudoku task was a customized program from an open 
source. The program was altered so that all participants would have access to a randomly 
generated puzzle with 33 blank cells set at the “Easy” difficulty level. Previous pilot 
testing showed that the Easy setting allowed for most participants to solve between three 
to four puzzles in a session. No actions were allowed in the Sudoku program except to fill 
empty cells with numbers, clear cells, and view the instructions for the game (see 
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Appendix A for a screenshot of the game). There was a point contingency for playing the 
game. Points were awarded for every game completed, and the faster the participant 
completed the puzzle the more points they earned. The participant did not receive any 
point information except at the end of completed puzzles and in a form of a cumulative 
score at the end of the session. 
The Sudoku program served multiple purposes. Not only did it provide a 
distraction task for the participant to avoid explicit counting behavior and mimic daily 
activity, but it also served as the platform for the participant to report how much time has 
passed. Once started, the program ran for 30 minutes and a message box popped up on 
the screen every 3 minutes asking the participant to estimate how much time has passed 
since either the game began or since the last message box appeared. To evaluate whether 
there was any noticeable, systematic difference in time estimation depending on how the 
question was framed, 50% of the questions asked the participant to type their response 
“in seconds,” and the other 50% of the questions asked for a response “in minutes.” The 
first question every participant saw was framed in seconds; afterward, the questions 
alternated in a semi-random fashion based on a pre-specified formula. The participant 
was required to type in a number before gaining access to the puzzle. No contingency 
was set in response to the participant’s typed timing estimates. 
After the 30 minute Sudoku session ended, participants completed a brief post-
study survey consisting of minimal demographic information, questions about the 
training and program, and self-reports of personal time management skills and strategies. 
Participants were asked to provide their year in school, major, and previous history with 
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playing Sudoku. Feedback questions included information about the degree of 
helpfulness of the Sudoku training instructions. Self-report questions asked participants 
to rate how well they manage their time, how long it takes them to make daily decisions 
and work on projects. Participants were asked to report whether they thought there was a 
pattern to the message box appearances (e.g., same time every time, different times in a 
pattern), and whether they had any methods for helping them report the time in the 
message boxes. 
Procedure. When the participants arrived, the research assistant would have them 
sit in the front area of the lab. There the participants were read the information sheet 
about the study and were given a brief explanation about the credit and raffle. After 
introducing the participant to the study, the research assistant provided the participant 
with a one-page set of instructions on how to play Sudoku and a blank practice Sudoku 
puzzle to complete. Time to complete the practice puzzle was recorded and research 
assistants checked every puzzle for 100% accuracy. If the participant made errors in the 
puzzle, the cells with incorrect numbers were circled and the participant was asked to fix 
their errors. Once the participant completed the puzzle with no errors, they were moved 
to a lab computer with the Sudoku program. 
Participants were given brief instructions regarding the Sudoku program, that they 
should complete as many puzzles as possible and that they would be asked to answer 
some questions while they played. Once participants started playing the computerized 
Sudoku task, they would be left to work alone. The research assistant sat on the other side 
of a partition, in case there were any questions. The Sudoku program ran for 30 minutes 
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with the condition set to interrupt the task every 3 minutes with a retrospective timing 
question (for a total of 10 timing responses). 
Once the Sudoku session ended, participants were told how many points they 
earned throughout the session, how the points equates to number of raffle entries, and 
then instructed to take a short post-study survey using Qualtrics. 
Study design and data analysis. The independent variable in the study was the 
unit in which the timing question was asked. All participants were asked 10 times, every 
three minutes, to type in how long they thought it had been since the last time they were 
asked. Whether the question asked for seconds or minutes was alternated in a semi-
random order based on a pre-programmed formula, to control for any order and to 
prevent predictable patterns. 
The primary goals for the study included: determining the feasibility of the 
Sudoku task, general assessment of timing accuracy and variability in self-reported 
timing estimates, whether there are any correlations of timing accuracy and variability 
with puzzle playing performance, and finally gauging the social validity of the procedure. 
Puzzle activity was recorded on various levels: (a) number of games played, (b) amount 
of time spent on each game, (c) number of points earned for each game, (d) number of 
correct and incorrect responses, and (e) real-time mouse click records. Time reporting 
was also recorded and then assessed based on accuracy (time estimate difference from 
target time of three minutes) and variability (standard deviation of participants’ 
estimates). Descriptive statistics were used to investigate general trends and correlations 
85 
 
between variables. For inferential statistics, only t-tests were used to evaluate any 
differences between emergent groups. 
2. Results and discussion 
Logistically speaking, the procedure worked well to run participants through the 
training, game, and survey all within an hour. Sometimes time was strained if participants 
took longer to complete the practice puzzle during training. Two participants had to be 
excused from the study without completing the final survey, requiring their data to be 
excluded from analyses.  
 For the timing estimates, there was some unanticipated variability that needed to 
be accounted for. What quickly became evident was that many participants failed to 
discriminate based on time unit requested in the message box. For example, after a three-
minute interval, if the participant was asked to report (in minutes) how much time has 
elapsed since the last question, the participant might have typed in “240.” Assuming the 
participant did not literally think it have been 240 minutes, data suggesting gross 
miscalculation was assumed to reference time in a different unit (i.e., seconds). Eleven of 
the 27 participants (40%) only typed responses in one unit or the other, meaning 
providing a time estimate in the correct unit 50% of the time.  
 Regardless of whether participants reported their time estimates in the requested 
unit (i.e., seconds or minutes), all responses were converted to seconds to assess the 
degree of accuracy and variability of responding throughout the session. Figure 1 depicts 
each participant’s average timing estimate accuracy as it relates to the variability of their 
estimates. Accuracy was determined as a degree of timing error. Values were calculated 
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by taking the difference between the participant’s response and the target time, in 
seconds. Thus, zero would denote complete accuracy, a positive value would mean that 
the participant was overestimating time, and a negative value would indicate 
underestimation. Variability was calculated by taking the standard deviation of all 10 
timing estimates. Zero variability means that the person typed in the same duration every 
time they were prompted, and increasingly larger values indicate greater variability. 
Considering that the messages appeared at the same interval each time, variable estimates 
raise some questions. 
 During the Qualtrics survey, after completing the Sudoku session, participants 
were asked various questions about the Sudoku task and the timing questions. 
Particularly, they were asked to indicate if they noticed any pattern with which the 
message boxes appeared: (a) same time every time, (b) different times, alternating in a 
pattern, or (c) different times shown in no pattern. The question was meant to evaluate 
whether participants could tact the message appearances separately from reporting time 
estimates. Ten participants (37%) correctly selected the option that the message boxes 
appeared at the same time every time (i.e., a fixed-time schedule).  
 Participants were also asked in the Qualtrics survey to provide their timing 
method, if they had one, for how they knew what number to type in the message box. The 
timing strategies, when provided, varied greatly; however, the variable of greater interest 
became whether the participant stated a timing method at all. Nine participants (33%) 
indicated some form of a timing strategy. Upon further analysis, seven of the nine 
participants also correctly identified the fixed-time schedule of the message boxes, 
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accounting for 70% of the participants who marked the fixed-time question option. The 
overlap between persons who indicated a timing method and those who correctly 
identified the fixed time schedule suggests that the participant’s self-generated rules 
facilitated larger timing patterns.  
 Timing methods appeared to have an effect of noticing larger patterns, but it is 
less clear how they may have facilitated or inhibited the noticing of more molecular 
changes in the environment. Given the natural division in the participant sample between 
correctly identifying the fixed-time schedule of the messages and marking that the 
message appeared variably, a two-tailed t-test was conducted to evaluate whether there 
was a group difference on discriminating the units in the text of the message box. That is 
whether correctly identifying the timing pattern would be related to noticing whether the 
questions were asking for responses in both seconds and minutes. The t-test revealed that 
participants who identified the fixed-time schedule were significantly less likely to 
provide timing estimates in the correct unit. Participants who incorrectly guessed the 
question interval pattern were more likely to discriminate the textual stimuli (t = 2.11, p = 
0.01; Cohen’s d = 1.15, see Figure 2).  
 Other correlations and analyses produced nonsignificant effects, such as relating 
measures for relative timing accuracy and variability as it compares to Sudoku playing, 
responding in the correct unit, having a timing strategy, and self-reported time 
management skills. There was a small correlation (r = .33) between self-reported time 
management skills and game performance, roughly suggesting that better participant time 
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management skills ratings were positively related to points earned in the Sudoku 
program.  
 In terms of social validity, data from the Qualtrics survey revealed several helpful 
findings to guide the Study 2. When asked about the quality of the Sudoku training, 15 
participants (56%) indicated that the training prepared them for playing the Sudoku game 
either “Well” or “Extremely well.” When prompted for additional comments, two 
participants indicated that they enjoyed the experience of learning how to play Sudoku 
with no participants indicating frustration or distress during the process. Reviewing the 
data from the survey indicated that the procedure was generally acceptable to 
participants, and highlighted some opportunities for improvement in the second study.  
B. Study 2 
 The second study was conducted to begin assessing the effects of written 
instructions on timing accuracy and variability. The first study showed that without any 
programmed verbal intervention, there was a steadily inconsistent pattern of timing 
estimates for longer durations. The next step in evaluating how verbal behavior interacts 
with timing was adding instructions to see if orienting their attention to specific 
environmental events restricts behavior to influence timing accuracy and variability. If an 
instruction functioned as a track, we would expect the participant’s timing estimates at 
least reduce in variation, if not also approach the target interval (i.e., three minutes). 
Based on the lessons learned from the first study, the second study was conducted to 
further evaluate the degree of timing accuracy, based on three-minute intervals, with 
several differences.  
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First, the Sudoku training was modified to make it more interactive, thus 
presumably more effective. Although most participants had indicated in the previous 
study that the training adequately prepared them to perform the Sudoku task, there was 
still a wide range of variability in the time it would take participants to complete the 
practice puzzle. Not only could variable completion times produce more noise in the 
study, but there was a logistical concern of persons running out of time to do the whole 
study in an hour if their practice puzzle time exceeded 10 minutes (involving roughly half 
of the participants run through Study 1). Although it was not the primary focus of the 
study, findings from the altered training are reported to demonstrate the greater exertion 
of experimental control in this second pilot study. 
 The second significant shift in the next study was how participants reported their 
timing response. No promising trends emerged in manipulating the unit of time 
requested, so there was no need to keep a typed response. To create more formal 
similarity with basic timing research and remove superfluous verbal responses with 
respect to timing, participants were asked to press a button whenever they think it had 
been three minutes, every three minutes. In the literature, this is called “interval 
production.” In particular it is an “empty” interval because the button press is meant to 
terminate the interval, rather than having the participant press and hold the button for a 
targeted duration.  Typically, producing time intervals are for short periods, where the 
participant holds down a key for an instructed duration; empty interval production was 
chosen for feasibility concerns.  
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 Thirdly, this study used a different approach of manipulating verbal stimuli to 
potentially impact timing responses. To do this, four groups of participants experienced 
difference sequences of experimental conditions. One group (i.e., Control) ran through 
the program without any additional instruction other than to complete puzzles and press 
the button every three minutes. Three experimental groups each saw a unique message 
either prompting them to notice specific changing events in the environment or to 
generate their own rule for timing. 
 Finally, additional questions were added to the Qualtrics survey at the end to 
better track the degree of enjoyment participants perceived the Sudoku task, as well as, 
more specific questions about timing strategies and perceived time-related abilities. 
1. Method 
Participants and Setting. For the second study, participants consisted of 37 
students at the University of Nevada, Reno recruited through the university’s various 
subject pools for the social sciences. We accepted all participants provided they were at 
least 17 years of age. Sixty-five percent (n = 24) of the participants identified as female. 
The sample represented all level of students at the university level from first year students 
to those working toward an advanced degree (Figure 3). 
By participating, individuals earned either one or two credits depending on the 
standards set by each subject pool. Like the first study, participants were all entered into a 
raffle for a $25 Visa gift card. Participating automatically gave each participant one ticket 
entry to the raffle, but they were told that better performance in the game could win them 
extra tickets to increase their chances (see Table 3 for point contingencies for the Sudoku 
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task, and Appendix B full point-to-ticket distribution breakdown). The study took place 
in the same lab room as the first study. 
Materials and Procedure. The same materials and procedure were used for the 
second study as with the first. The second study includes some refinements, such as with 
the new training protocol and more specific questions in the Qualtrics survey. The 
Sudoku program also was modified to change the form of timing response required and 
introduced experimental conditions for groups of participants. 
Based on the variability of completion times on the training puzzle, the Sudoku 
training was revised to Study 2. All participants, regardless of their familiarity with 
playing Sudoku were provided an interactive training, akin to direct instruction. In a form 
of backwards chaining procedure, the research assistant showed the participant a 
completed Sudoku puzzle and explains the rules of the game, and then the participant 
works through two increasingly difficult iterations of the puzzle to demonstrate basic 
skills (see Appendix C for Sudoku training script). After the interactive training session 
(usually lasting only a few minutes), the participants received a practice puzzle to 
complete. The same puzzle was used as what was in the first study. Research assistants 
did not assist, unless asked. Upon completion, research assistants checked for 100% 
accuracy and had the participants correct any errors. All practice puzzle completion times 
were timed, and averaged 6.7 minutes (range 4 - 14). This was an average decrease in 




The program used for the Sudoku task was the same as in the first study, with the 
addition of a green time button to the right side of the screen and instructions to push the 
button every three minutes. Instead of 10 messages appearing to ask for a time estimate, 
message screens only appeared at strategic times based on the condition combination of 
the assigned group. Four different messages were shown to various participants, with the 
experimental instructions prompting different behaviors. See Appendix B for a 
screenshot of the game and the message screen.  
One of the most significant procedural changes between studies was moving from 
time estimate responding to interval production. A single contingency for game playing 
may have inhibited button pressing; thus, another point contingency was built into the 
program. Increasingly large sums of points could be earned for pressing the button more 
accurately, that is, closer to the target time of three minutes (i.e., 180 seconds). The 
contingency followed more of a hyperbolic function than a linear function, to discourage 
participants from pressing the button more frequently to earn more points (see Table 4 for 
specific timing accuracy-to-point breakdown). The second study combined the points 
earned for pushing the time button with the same point contingency for playing the game 
(Table 3). Just as in Study 1, however, the participant never received point feedback 
except at the end of the completed puzzle with a cumulative point score at the end of the 
task. 
The same Qualtrics survey was used as before with some additional questions 
about gender, likeability of the task, and timing strategies. In the previous study, 
participants could opt out of providing a timing strategy, presumably if they had none. 
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Since interval production requires an operant response to signal a temporal judgment, 
participants indicating they had no timing strategy saw an additional question asking 
them why they pushed the button when they did. Either way, participants reported their 
own explanation for their timing response. 
Experimental design and data analysis. In contrast to the first study, the second 
began to systematically investigate whether and to what degree different instructions 
influenced timing accuracy and variability. Starting at a rudimentary level, this study 
evaluated the relative effectiveness of instructions as timing tracks, with different groups 
of participants seeing a unique instruction. The first 12 participants were assigned to the 
Control group. They were initially run through the whole 30-minute session without 
seeing specific instructions, to provide a basis for stability of accuracy and variation of 
timing estimates for a prolonged period. These data were also used to determine the 12-
minute baseline for the experimental groups, to increase the chances of participants 
pressing the time button at least twice before they saw the first message. From thereafter, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups, each with its own 
experimental condition. 
There were four possible messages the participants could have seen (Figure 4). 
For all participants, the message “Remember--You earn points by completing as many 
Sudoku puzzles as you can AND by pressing the time button every three minutes” 
appeared before the participant started the Sudoku program. For the participants in 
experimental groups, there was a 12-minute baseline of playing Sudoku and pressing the 
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button without further messaging, and for the Control group there was no additional 
messaging.  
The experimental conditions each included a unique instruction that was written 
to occasion various types of responding. The same experimental message was shown to 
the participant twice, at the 12th and 21st minutes. One group saw the message “As you 
play the game notice each time you fill in an empty cell. How does your game playing fit 
in with button pressing?” to orient the participant to track time as a function of their own 
behavior patterns (hereafter “Behavior group”). Another saw the message “As you play 
the game notice as you breathe in and out. How does your breath fit in with button 
pressing?” to orient the participant to their own physiological responding to track time 
(hereafter “Breath group”). And the last group saw “The next phase will be 9 minutes 
long. Continue to play the Sudoku game and press the button every three minutes,” to set 
the occasion for the participant to generate their own rule to tracking time (hereafter 
“Self-rule group”). 
The conditions and messages were developed based on the available verbal 
behavior literature that might indicate which type of environmental change, and from 
which source, the verbal stimulus would most likely function as a track. The messages for 
the Behavior and Breath groups were attempts to evaluate whether attending to certain 
forms and loci of changing events impacted the accuracy and variability of timing. In the 
case of Study 2, the only sources for immediately observable or predictable change came 
from their participant: either their performance in the task or their own bodily functions 
(i.e., breathing). Part of the studies premise is that individuals best track time when 
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attending to relevant stimulus change, thus providing two sources with different patterns 
of change could indicate what changes are more relevant for this type of timing task. A 
secondary interest was to take a novel look at activities that orient individuals to the 
present moment, which is a component of many mindfulness activities. It is not clear 
whether attending to a somewhat continuous change in the present, like breathing, may 
interfere with time tracking or enhance it. The self-rule message was developed to assess 
whether timing effectiveness would be similarly effective with implicit instructions. 
Data analyses: For within-group analyses, each participant in an experimental 
group experienced two conditions, 12 minutes of baseline followed by 18 minutes 
wherein a message appeared twice at the 12th and 21st minute. Differences between 
baseline and experimental condition were evaluated within each group of participants in 
terms of button pressing rate, accuracy and variability. Rudimentary descriptive statistics 
were also used for visual analysis to investigate potential relations between timing and 
Sudoku performance (e.g., number of games completed, total errors). For between-group 
analyses, each group’s results were compared with each other to determine the relative 
effectiveness of each instruction on timing accuracy and variability. Finally, data were 
compiled from the Qualtrics survey in relation to the study’s findings. 
3. Results and discussion 
The 37 participants were roughly split into four equal groups: Control (n = 11), 
Behavior (n = 9), Breath (n = 10), and Self-rule (n = 7). The following results will be 
discussed in terms of both within-group and between group differences. 
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Interval production. We took three approaches to analyzing time through the 
participant’s production of the interval: rate of button pressing, timing accuracy, and 
timing variability. The rate of button pressing was calculated by counting the number of 
total button presses per phase, per participant, then divided by the number of minutes in 
the respective phase (e.g., 12 or 9). Accuracy and variability were calculated similarly as 
in Study 1, where accuracy was determined as degree of constant error. Constant error in 
the literature is the absolute value of the difference between the target interval and the 
produced interval (Grondin & Killeen, 2009), such that any difference from the target 
duration (i.e., 180 seconds, 3 minutes) was evaluated the same. Variability of produced 
intervals was calculated by taking the standard deviation between intervals for each 
individual. 
The individual button press rates were averaged for each of the four groups (see 
Table 5, Figure 5). Overall average button pressing rates remained constant for the 
Control group, with a gradual improvement of about 27% (difference in rate of 0.06 
button presses per minute). The greatest changes throughout the session occurred for the 
Behavior and the Self-rule groups. The Behavior group on average experienced a steadily 
increasing rate in button pressing, starting with overestimating time and finishing by 
underestimating time (a 36% rate increase). The Self-rule group showed a different 
pattern than all the others in that they, on average, decreased their rate of responding with 
decreasing accuracy before drastically improving their button rate. The overall shift in 
rate at the beginning compared to the end phase was less than the change seen in the 
Control group. However, between the first time the Self-rule group got the explicit 
instruction about the 9-minute phase, and the second time, accuracy of button rate 
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rebounds 37%. From this analysis, the differences in rate and pattern of rate did change 
between groups. A preliminary glance suggested that the different instructions were 
influencing timing as measured by button pressing rate. 
Accuracy and variability were analyzed separately to provide a comprehensive 
view of how participants estimated time for long durations and whether there may be 
subtle effects occurring with the varying experimental instructions. Timing accuracy is a 
focal point for timing studies, but if the underlying assumption of timing is that 
organisms are attending to relevant environmental change, then they may not necessarily 
become more ‘accurate’ with respect to clock time, but reduce in variability as the 
individual successfully tracks patterns of change. This may look like a group showing 
steady inaccuracy throughout the session, but with low or decreasing variability.  
Figure 6 provides the varying constant error of the intervals produced through 
each of the three phases, by group. Figure 7 shows the data for variability of timing 
estimates. Refer to Table 6 for exact calculations for accuracy and variability across 
groups. Through visual analysis, trends and patterns were discernable between groups. 
Since these data were linked to the average rates of button pressing, the trends in 
accuracy show similar results with some additional precision. The Behavior group, on 
average, changed the least and was closest to approach perfect accuracy over the 30-
minute session. Both the Breath group and the Self-rule group decreased in accuracy 
between minutes 12 and 21; and they both reversed directions during the third phase. On 




Interval variation increased over the session for all groups, with the Breath group 
seeing the largest group with the standard deviation of time estimates doubling between 
the baseline and third phase. The Behavior group’s average timing estimates were the 
least variable by a small margin, but also changed the least across the three phases.  
In addition to analyzing the variability of the intervals, we also tracked the 
variability of button pressing throughout the session. That is, for every 3-minute interval 
(10 total), each button press was tallied for each participant. Distribution of button 
pressing was calculated both as average button press per 3-minute interval across groups 
(Figure 8), and standard deviation of button pressing per 3-minute interval across groups 
(Figure 9). Table 7 provides the exact values and ranges for average button pressing per 
interval. 
Puzzle performance. As a secondary focus for timing, we measured the 
participants’ performances in the Sudoku session. Part of this research aimed to integrate 
additional layers to timing studies to enhance its external validity. An implicit assumption 
of the current research is that increasing timing awareness is a helpful repertoire for 
adopting effective and efficient practices; but the literature suggests that at a certain level, 
focusing on time may interfere with other activities. This research allowed for an initial 
look at Sudoku performance across groups, by considering the number and duration of 
games. 
Figure 10 shows how puzzle completion varied across groups. In the figures the 
average number of games played per participant, arranged by group. For this sample, the 
Control and Self-rule groups completed the most number of games per session (3.5 and 
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3.6 games, respectively), with the Breath and Behavior groups performing below average 
on average (2.8 and 2.7 games, respectively). Table 8 lays out the average duration and 
standard deviation of game duration for each group. 
Qualtrics data. In the post-experiment survey, there were a few questions 
pertaining to methods the participants may have developed throughout the session. In the 
first study, the participants who disclosed that they had a timing strategy were also more 
successful at identifying the fixed-time schedule in which the questions appeared. Those 
data could support the notion that timing strategies function as tracks for orienting 
individuals to changing events (i.e., time). While there were no questions to interrupt 
them, the rate of button presses and accuracy were compared between participants with 
and without a reported method. First, only 9 out of 37 participants indicated that they had 
a method for pushing the time button. No relation was found between groups on the 
average button press rate or interval accuracy. 
If the participant selected that they did not have a timing method, they were 
prompted to describe how they knew to push the button. The qualitative data for these 
responses are challenging to discern much of a pattern, but apparently most participants 
had a limited verbal repertoire in tacting their timing responses. Fifteen (40%) of 
participants used words appealing to a feeling or “gut” reaction to timing. The sources for 
describing our temporal awareness based on feel are unclear, but the overall conclusion is 
that participants are generally unaware of how they track time, regardless of the accuracy 
and variability of their timing estimates. 
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The Qualtrics survey was also used to collect general demographic information 
and some social validity data. For example, most participants (31 out of 37) indicated that 
they had played Sudoku before the study and self-reported middling self-management 
skills (average of 4.6 on a 7-point Likert scale). We wanted to see whether participants 
had previous mindfulness training, which could affect their level of timing awareness 
before entering the study (see Figure 11). Generally participants felt prepared to play the 
Sudoku game after the training (Figure 12) and typically liked playing Sudoku puzzles 
for extended periods of time (Figure 13).  
C. Study 3 
 Based on the findings of the first two studies, the purpose of the final dissertation 
study was to further determine ways by which verbal behavior may function to orient 
individuals to aspects of environmental change via measuring timing accuracy and 
variability. In addition to increasing the sample size to make the findings from the second 
study more robust, the third study attempted to further control for individual differences 
by adding a discriminative stimulus at the beginning of the Sudoku task. From the second 
study it appeared that timing accuracy and variability improved for both experimental 
groups regarding the noticing of one’s behavior in the game and their breath. Although 
some group averages appeared to diverge, a small sample size and pronounced individual 
differences enhanced the likelihood of nonsignificant findings. The final study ran 61 
participants, with additional feature of the protocol to reduce noise in the timing 
response. Because the motivation around these series of studies was to generate 
discussion around the various ways verbal behavior may have an impact on timing, the 
following results and discussion elaborate more extensively on the self-reported timing 
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abilities and timing methods used during the task as additional variables worth 
considering. 
1. Method 
Participants. Over the course of Spring 2017 and Summer 2017 terms at the 
University of Nevada, Reno, 61 participants participated in the final study. All 
participants were accepted, provided they were at least 17 years of age. The benefits for 
the study were the same as in the previous studies. 
Materials and Procedure. The same training materials and customized Sudoku 
program were used as in the first two studies. The procedure was modified to include an 
initial three-minute timer to signal when the participant should press the green time 
button for the first time. Because the experimental emphasis of these studies relied upon 
antecedent manipulation, there was no direct feedback mechanisms to washout any 
potential weak effects. The three-minute timer, then, allowed for an initial “correct trial” 
for every participant directly from the beginning.  
The post-experiment Qualtrics survey was also updated to include race/ethnicity 
to the list of demographic questions and the timing related multiple choice questions were 
revised to more closely describe the type of timing required during the study (see 
Appendix D for full list of questions and coded values). 
Experimental design and data analysis. The proposed study was a continuation 
and extension of the second study. For Study 3 there were three groups: Control, 
Behavior, and Breath. Similar to Study 2, participants either encountered 27 minutes of 
baseline condition (Control), or nine minutes of baseline, followed by two instances of 
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the same message being presented at the 12th minute and the 21st minute (Behavior and 
Breath groups; see Figure 14). Although the session was still 30 minutes in length, 27 
minutes were considered for analysis since the first three minutes interval production was 
provided to the participants through the timer, making for three phases of nine minutes. 
For the current study, data analyses focused on two primary calculations for 
accuracy (i.e., constant error) and variability (i.e., standard deviation). From the previous 
studies, there was no indication of importance regarding over or under responding; thus, 
the absolute value describes the overall deviation from 180 seconds to streamline analysis 
interpretation. For aggregating the data, averages for each individual’s responses were 
calculated, and group data were calculated by averaging the individual’s averaged data. 
Similarly for variability, the standard deviation of each response interval was recorded 
and then averaged for each phase. Group reports of variability are the averaged standard 
deviation values for each individual. 
Similar data analyses will be conducted in the proposed study with the addition of 
running ANOVAs for within-subject differences between repeated measures. A 
combination of descriptive and inferential statistics are described below. 
2. Results and discussion 
 Demographics. The post-experiment questionnaire on Qualtrics provided some 
basic information on the sample participants. Of the 61 participants, 17 identified as male 
(27.8%), 43 as female, and one preferred not to disclose. There was a fairly even 
distribution of males across groups (range: 2-7). Thirty-three (54%) of the participants 
self-identified as “Caucasian / White” with a fairly event distribution of other racial 
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identities: African American (n = 3), Asian American/Pacific Islander (n = 8), 
Hispanic/Latino (n = 7), Other (n = 7). A repeated measures ANCOVA determined that 
there were no significant effects between the three nine minute phases when considering 
gender, F(1, 56) = .01, p = .91, and race, F(1, 56) = .46, p = .50. Since the two covariates 
were not significant, the preceding analyses will utilize a repeated measure ANOVA. 
Twenty-one (34%) participants indicated they were psychology majors. 
 In additional to personal demographic variance, participants also reported on 
histories that could potentially affect the results, if biased. Participants provided 
information on their previous experiences with playing Sudoku or practicing 
mindfulness, how well they think they track time on a daily basis, and whether they had a 
method for pressing the time button, (see Appendix D to read the full survey questions 
and response options). Using a one-way ANOVA, no significant differences between 
groups (Control, Behavior, Breath) were found (see Tables 9-10 for descriptives and 
nonsignificant group differences). Overall, 30 participants indicated that they were either 
“very familiar” or “somewhat familiar” with playing Sudoku (operational definitions 
provided in Appendix D). When asked “How well do you track time in your daily life?” 
distributions approached a normal distribution across groups, with 29 participants (47%) 
indicating they track time moderately well (see Figure 15). 
Within group analyses. Several within group analyses were conducted to provide 
some insights into the question of timing accuracy and variability over time. Most timing 
research, regardless of the target interval select a variety of intervals to investigate the 
relative accuracy and variability of timing on a scale. These series of studies have 
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focused on the precision and consistency of time production at the same interval. Due to 
the novel procedure, within subject timing trends were equally as important to evaluate as 
the between group trends.  
Regardless of the group or phase, participants often overestimated the three-
minute interval, meaning that the response intervals were typically greater than three 
minutes (see Figure 16). Average accuracy for timing responses across all groups was 85 
seconds, meaning that on average participants pressed the time button a minute and 25 
seconds before or after (usually after) the three-minute mark. The average variation for 
the sample was 54 seconds, meaning that the average deviation of a participant’s own 
timing estimates was within a little less than a minute.  
Like in Study 2, button pressing rate was calculated as one method of depicting 
the relative trends of interval production over a 30-minute session. With three, nine-
minute phases, accurate button rate would be one button press every three minutes, or .33 
button presses per minute. In Figure 17, average button press rate was below the accurate 
rate, implying overestimation, despite the initial three-minute timer provided at the 
beginning of the program. Over the next two phases, all three groups experienced an 
average increase in button press rate, which approached accuracy.  
To evaluate timing patterns throughout the session, intervals were recorded as 
frequencies in 30 one-minute blocks. For example, if a participant pressed the time button 
at 400 seconds into the program, it would have been recorded in the “420 second” 
interval, but at 421 seconds, it would have been recorded in the “480 second” interval. 
Figure 18 shows the average response frequency across the session for each group. One 
105 
 
concern of the experimental design was that both the instruction groups received two 
brief interruptions during their Sudoku session, whereas the Control group received no 
message interruption. Any significant changes after the message appearance could be 
attributed to the interruption signaling the end of a three-minute interval, rather than the 
functional stimulus control of the instruction.  
Looking at Figure 18, there were no significant group differences between control 
and experimental groups for the first few minutes after the instructions were shown to 
experimental groups. When comparing differences between each of the 10 three-minute 
intervals (i.e., 180, 360, 540…), the assumption of sphericity was violated, Mauchly’s 
W(44) = .12, p < .001, therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was utilized. The 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant differences within the first three three-
minute intervals, where there was a substantial dip in average responding between the 
third and sixth minute, F(6.99, 419.53) = 7.18, p < .001, ƞ2 = .11, despite the fact that it 
was the interval immediately following the interval with the timer. There were no 
significant differences for any of the groups between the intervals where the messages 
occurred. Although variable, a cycle pattern can be detected for both the control and 
experimental groups. Even though the participants tended to overestimate the 3-minute 
target, on average there is an orderly pattern of consistent responding throughout the 
session. 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to investigate any significant differences 
between time points for each group. Three phases were used based on the experimental 
design. Phase 1 consisted of activity between minutes 3 and 12, phase 2 consisted of 
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activity between minutes 12 and 21, and phase 3 consisted of activity between minutes 21 
and 30.  
Timing accuracy was interpreted as a factor of constant error, or the absolute 
difference (in seconds) from the target interval of three minutes (i.e., 180 seconds). When 
considering all Study 3 participants, accuracy varied significantly between the first and 
second phase, F(2, 116) = 3.92, p = .02, where participants were 27.6 seconds more 
accurate, on average, in the first 9 minutes, compared to the second phase (M = 98.70, p 
= .004). Participants’ accuracy was approaching significant difference in the same 
direction, where participants were about 21 seconds more accurate in the first phase, than 
the third (M = 92.29, p = .05). When looking at within-subject differences between the 
groups, significant changes in accuracy only occurred for the Breath group, F(2, 38) = 
4.75, p = .01, ƞ2 = .20 (Table 11). There were no significant differences between phases 
for the Control and Behavior groups.  
For timing variability, calculated by using the standard deviation of intervals for 
each individual in each phase, there was no significant change between phases. Although 
the variability of interval production did not significantly differ from each response 
between phases, accuracy and variability were positively related at the sample and group 
levels (see Table 12). For all groups for the whole session, the greater accuracy (i.e., the 
lower the constant error) significantly predicted lesser variability (i.e., standard 
deviations closest to zero). 
 Performance data were also recorded and tracked to later discuss how an 
interfering, non-timing task could impact timing responses. The average total games 
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completed for the sample was 3.4 games (range: 0-10, SD = 1.7 games), with the average 
game duration clocking at 552 seconds (i.e., 9.2 minutes). Figure 19 depicts game 
averages across groups, no significant differences between groups were found, F(1, 58) = 
1.88, p = .16. 
Sudoku playing behavior was found to be significantly related to the person’s 
self-reported familiarity with Sudoku before the study, r = .48, p < .001, where the more 
experienced Sudoku players generally completed more games per session. Furthermore, 
response rates were analyzed for entering numbers into the Sudoku puzzles. The number 
entry rate was also significantly correlated with reported Sudoku experience, r = .51, p = 
.02, where the players with more reported experience tended to enter numbers faster than 
those with less experience with the game.  
 Game playing also improved over the course of the session, F(2, 116) = 7.23, p = 
.001. For both the Control and Behavior groups, average game completion rate was 
greater in the second two phases, compared with the first (Table 13). There was no 
significant difference between the phases for the Breath group.  
It has been well documented in the literature that an interference effect occurs 
during timing tasks when participants are required to do a separate, non-timing task 
(Fortin, 1999). Figure 20 shows a cumulative record of Sudoku activity and time button 
pressing over time to demonstrate the potential relation between the two activities. The 
relationship is further demonstrated when subdividing the sample into two groups: high 
rate button pressers (underestimating the interval) and low rate button pressers 
(overestimating the interval). Figure 21 displays the cumulative record for Sudoku 
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activity and button pressing for the high and low rate groups. It appears that participants 
who pressed the time button more often also entered numbers into the puzzle at a faster 
rate. It should be noted that the data shown in the cumulative records are from the 
Control group only. A bug in the program code prevented the accurate recording of 
Sudoku activity in the experimental groups which prevented mapping their activity on 
this molecular level.  
To statistically evaluate the degree of relatedness, a series of correlations were 
conducted to determine whether either timing accuracy or variability was significantly 
correlated with game completion rate. From the data collected, there were some 
significant correlations between timing and game playing. Both accuracy and variability 
were correlated with games completed for each of the three phases, as well as for the 
whole sessions (see Tables 14 and 15 for accuracy and variability respectively). There 
were few instances where there were any significant correlation between the timing 
metrics and the game completion. The Breath group’s average accuracy was negatively 
correlated with game completion, r = -.46, p = .04, suggesting that the greater deviance 
from the target interval (i.e., greater inaccuracy) related with completing fewer games.  
Between group analyses. Upon initial visual analyses, the Breath group’s timing 
responses more closely fit with the three-minute target interval (Figure 22) and the 
Behavior group responses mimic the Control group. Furthermore, the within-group 
variability across the session could indicate the degree of stimulus control of relevant 
change for individuals in the same groups. Not only does the Breath group appear to be, 
on average, more accurate but as a group the variability of responding also appears to 
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remain low (Figure 23). The three groups determined a priori (Control, Behavior, Breath) 
based on the experimental manipulations did not appear equal during baseline.  
Despite the group separation detected in the cumulative records for accuracy and 
within-group variability, other figures depict some initial differences between groups at 
baseline (Figure 24). Steps were taken to randomly assign participants to each group. 
Since the assumption of homogeneity of variance for a one-way ANOVA was met, the 
results revealed significant differences between groups at baseline, F(2, 57) = 3.77, p = 
.03, F(2, 36) = 5.31, p = .01, for accuracy and variability respectively. A Tukey HSD post 
hoc test revealed that the Breath group’s accuracy was closer to the target of 180 seconds 
during baseline (M = 43.97, SD = 37.05) than both the Control group (M = 83.9, SD = 
59.1, p = .06) and the Behavior group (M = 85.56, SD = 63.06, p = .04). Initial group 
differences increase the likelihood of Type I error thus a more judicious approach to 
summarizing the a priori group data is to focus on within-group analyses (as described 
above).  
The between-group analyses, then, were post hoc analyses investigating other 
potentially relevant variables such as the presence and level of complexity of timing 
methods, self-reported timing ability, and previous experiences with mindfulness 
training.  The primary significant between group findings for Study 3 revolves around the 
timing methods that participants reportedly used during the Sudoku session. The 
originally intended independent variable, the presence or absence of instructions to orient 
the participant to different sources of environmental change, did impact the degree of 
complexity of self-reported timing methods. Regardless of whether the participant 
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indicated that they had a timing method for tracking time, all participants were required 
to comment on what prompted them to press the time button. All open responses were 
coded to look for similarity of strategies in terms of methods and level of specificity (see 
Table 16 for coded frequencies). More often than not (21 out of 22 participants), 
participants who indicated that they had a method for pressing the time button, provided 
more specific strategies and tactics, such as counting the number of Sudoku squares filled 
to track time. Most of the participants who marked that they did not have a method used 
words like “feeling” and “instinct” to explain their behavior. No participant indicated 
monitoring breath as a method for tracking time. 
To help capture this variation of timing methods, the coded responses were 
further consolidated into a 3-point scale of complexity: generic, simple, and complex. 
The generic responses were any comment that referred to an unclear explanation for time 
tracking, typically attributing their timing to a feeling or instinct. For example, one 
participant claimed “I wouldn't really think about it but every now and then I would get a 
thought saying ‘it feels like its [sic] been 3 minutes’ so I pressed it then.” Responses were 
coded as a simple method if there was a clear description of a single method that could be 
objectively measured or replicable. For example, one participant said that their method 
involved “Approximating the amount of time it took for [them] to complete a certain 
number of squares.” Finally, complex methods were considered to be two or more 
objectively measurable or replicable explanations. In this case participants offered 
compound strategies for their timing response, such as:  
I noticed that I was able to complete a little over 4 squares within the first three 
minutes. I tried to keep track of time by comparing how many I was completing 
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and trying to add time if I felt like I was completing the game quicker than the 
first one, or I would take away time if I felt like I was completing the game 
slower. 
Table 17 shows the count frequencies of participants with generic, simple, or complex 
methods across groups: Control, Behavior, Breath.  
 To determine whether the presence of instructions had any impact on the self-
generation of rules during the timing task, a two (group) by three (method complexity) 
ANOVA was conducted to compare participants who saw instructions against 
participants who saw no instructions. A significant difference was found, F(1, 59) = 4.85, 
p = .03, where participants in the experimental conditions reported more complex timing 
methods than the participants in the control condition. This finding indicates that the 
instructions served a role in setting the occasion for self-generation of rules (i.e., timing 
method). An ANOVA was conducted to evaluate degree of method complexity and 
interval accuracy with nonsignificant results. 
 In addition to demonstrating effects between experimental groups, timing 
complexity was also significantly correlated with Sudoku productivity, r = .29, p = .02, 
such that eight percent of the variance of the number of games completed is explained by 
the degree of method complexity. There was no significant difference found in the 
number of games completed between experimental groups, suggesting that there could be 
some common function between the development of complex rule generation and 
effectively playing Sudoku, rather than there being a connection based on the instructions 
presented throughout the Sudoku session.   
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Figure 25 shows the average accuracy of timing estimates across phases, based on 
how well the participant ranked their ability to track time on a daily basis. The survey 
question was based on a 5-point Likert scale, but to condense and make for more equally-
sized groups, the lowest two points (“Slightly well” and “Not well at all”) and the highest 
two points (“Extremely well” and “Very well”) were consolidated into low and high 
ability groups, with the middle group (“Moderately well”) were coded to be in the 
middle. Remember that accuracy has been calculated as the absolute value of the 
response interval minus 180 seconds. A greater value on the y-axis, the less accurate the 
average. The interaction effect of timing ability over the three phases was nonsignificant. 
Figure 26 shows the average accuracy of timing estimates across phases, based on 
whether the participant had previous exposure to mindfulness training or mindfulness-
based activities. A repeated measures ANOVA produced significant differences between 
phases for individuals who had no previous mindfulness exposure (n = 31), F(2, 60) = 
4.13, p = .02, ƞ2 = .12, but nonsignificant differences between phases for individuals who 
had experience mindfulness activities (n = 28), F(2, 27) = .001, p = .98 (Table 18). These 
results could indicate that the skills involved with mindfulness (i.e., awareness) may 
effectively increase time tracking over sustained periods. A one-way ANOVA to 
investigate group differences in phase 3 revealed nonsignificant difference based on 
mindfulness experience, F(1, 59) = 2.22, p = .14. There was about a 33 second mean 
difference between the two groups at phase 3 (109.4 seconds and 76.9 seconds for “no” 
and “yes/maybe” mindfulness experience respectively); however, given the strong degree 
of relatedness between accuracy and variability in timing estimates a mean difference of 
a half-minute was rendered insignificant. Although these results should be interpreted 
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lightly, future research investigating timing and mindfulness may reveal some interesting 
connections in terms of consistently tracking events over time. 
D. Cross-study comparisons 
 As stated previously, the primary aims of this research were: (a) to investigate the 
timing patterns produced for long durations multiple minutes over a sustained period of 
time as compared to similar studies for shorter durations, and (b) to identify conditions 
under which verbal antecedents and self-generated rules may impact timing in human 
participants. Three studies were conducted, each a form of replication and extension upon 
the other (Table 2), as an initial attempt to meet those two goals. The following results 
considered the data from all three studies. Reviewing the data across all three studies 
provided multiple benefits including larger sample sizes to find replicated trends across 
studies as well as the opportunity to find differences between studies, particularly as it 
relates to the two different operant responses required between Study 1 (time estimate) 
and Studies 2 and 3 (interval production).  
 Replicating findings for long durations. Two significant findings support the 
interference effect, which states that when completing a timing task and a non-timing task 
attention to the non-timing task will inhibit timing ability. For all studies, significant 
group differences were found for both timing accuracy and total Sudoku puzzles 
completed, based on whether the participant indicated that they had experienced playing 
Sudoku previous to the study. For timing accuracy, on average across the whole session, 
participants with no previous Sudoku experience deviated significantly more from the 
target interval (M = 101.77) than those with Sudoku experience (M = 62.95), F(1, 114) = 
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16.40, p < .001. For puzzle productivity, participants with no Sudoku experience on 
average completed fewer games (M = 2.61) than participants with Sudoku experience (M 
= 3.76), F(1, 114) = 8.34, p = .005. In this case self-reported Sudoku experience effected 
both timing and non-timing task activity.  
 In a similar vein, a significant correlation was found between accuracy (i.e., 
constant error) and the number of puzzles completed, r = -.20, p = .03, such that the 
reduction in error (greater accuracy) was related to an increase in the number of puzzle 
completed. With Sudoku experience as a common link, fluency of the non-timing task 
appears to influence the degree to which interference is observed.  
 The primary cross-study findings focused on the form of timing response required 
in the studies. Study 1 provided 10 prompts every three minutes for the participant to type 
in a time estimate. Studies 2 and 3 instructed the participants to press a button, in a free-
operant style procedure, to produce an empty time interval approximating three minutes. 
Three primary differences may implicate functional differences in timing as it relates to 
the relative impact of verbal behavior. 
 First, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the interaction of 
operant timing response over the three phases. The assumption of sphericity was met, χ2 
(2) = .35, p = .84. The same main effect as demonstrated in Study 3 was replicated in that 
there was a significant difference between phases F(2, 228) = 8.28, p < .001, η2 = .07. 
This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between operant response and 
phase, F(1, 228) = 6.06, p < .001, η2 =.05. At phase 1 there was no significant difference 
between groups (M = 55.55 seconds, M = 49.03 seconds, for time estimates and interval 
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production respectively), F(1, 114) = .61, p = .44. However, significant differences were 
found for both phase 2, F(1, 114) = 5.61, p = .02, and for phase 3, F(1, 114) = 6.11, p = 
.01. In phase 2, time estimates were significantly more accurate than the interval 
productions in terms of constant error (M = 62.00 seconds, M = 103.18 seconds, for time 
estimates and interval production respectively). In phase 3, time estimates again more 
accurate than the interval productions (M = 55.83 seconds, M = 96.02 seconds, for time 
estimates and interval production respectively). Comparing the total variability of 
responding over the course of the session was also significant between operant response 
modalities, F(1, 114) = 4.04, p = .05, where the time estimates were less variable (M = 
48.61 seconds) than the interval productions (M = 62.49 seconds).  
 The second finding built off the first and connects with existing literature on 
timing. It has been long established that timing estimates produce different results than 
interval production, where time estimates are typically shorter than the target interval 
(underestimating) and interval productions are longer (overestimating; see Table 19).  
Figure 27 shows the cumulative averages of time judgments throughout the 
Sudoku session. The dotted line was added for reference, where data above the line 
indicate underestimation of time and data below the line indicate overestimation. The 
regression effect was observed for the participants in Study 1 who provided time 
estimates. They typically underestimated time, which is thinking that less time has passed 
than it really has, whereas the overestimates of the interval productions demonstrate that 
participants clicked the time button less often than they should have. For example, when 
the blue line for Study 1 is at 900 seconds, that means that by the 6th prompt (which 
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occurred at 1,080 seconds), on average participants estimated that they were about 900 
seconds into the session. Thus, the blue group was generally "underestimating" the time 
intervals (they thought the 180 second interval was generally less than 180 seconds long). 
On the contrary, the participants from Studies 2 and 3 were "overestimating" time 
because on average, their responses were greater than 180 seconds. At 900 seconds, they 
should have been at 5 button presses but on average they were on their fourth button 
press or just under.  
Verbal interactions with timing responses. The final finding begins the 
conversation regarding the conditions under which verbal stimuli may influence timing 
behavior. As mentioned previously, whether the participant had a timing strategy was 
significantly related to correctly identifying the fixed interval pattern of the questions but 
were less likely to discriminate between the change in time units presented when the 
questions appeared. Furthermore, the participants who indicated that they had a timing 
strategy estimated time significantly more accurately (M = 40.14 seconds) than the 
participants who did not have a timing strategy (M = 65.66 seconds), F(1, 26) = 4.84, p = 
.04.  
 Based on the findings from Study 1, hypotheses were formed to investigate the 
effects of verbal strategies on timing at longer intervals. In Studies 2 and 3 the choice to 
have instructions presented as an antecedent independent variable was designed to set the 
occasion for more effective timing methods which would presumably reduce the error in 
interval production.There was no significant difference on timing accuracy between 
having a timing method and not, (M = 81. 02 seconds, M = 68.53 seconds, for having and 
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not having a timing method respectively), F(1, 86) = 1.17, p = .28. There was an 
important difference between Study 2 and Study 3 in that for the latter all participants 
were exposed to a three-minute timer which served as a discriminative stimulus for 
pressing the button for the first time. The timer may have played a role in exerting greater 
control over timing responses since the mean accuracy for Study 3 was 73.91 seconds, 
which was 10 seconds closer to the target interval than in Study 2 (M = 84.13 seconds). 
This difference, however, was not significant.  
 Also nonsignificant but worth mentioning was the proportion of participants who 
indicated they had a timing method in Studies 2 and 3. As mentioned previously, in Study 
2 most participants (76%) indicated that they did not have a method for pressing the time 
button. For Study 3, only 64% of participants indicated that they did not have a timing 
strategy. This small, nonsignificant decrease in the proportion of the sample without a 
timing method could be attributed to the timer providing more information for 
participants to base their timing response.  
VI. Discussion 
 The presented series of studies were a successive replication and extension of 
findings regarding human timing of three-minute-long intervals over sustained periods. 
The results contribute not only to the basic timing literature, but represent the exploration 
of verbal stimuli and verbal behavior as they interrelate with different response 
modalities of timing. Limitations should be addressed to further explore the original 
variables in question, but the strengths of these findings allow for the progressive 
research of timing as it more directly relates to daily human experiences.  
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Overview of main findings. The first aim of the dissertation research was to extend 
timing effects to longitudinal timing at a longer interval. Despite the prolific nature of 
basic timing researchers, very few of the findings from these labs are easily generalizable 
to a natural environment. Testing longer intervals helps to support timing theories that 
here-to-fore only existed on a limited scale, and bring the research closer to intervals that 
are relevant for human activity.  
For example, linking the interference effect to more naturalistic activities, like 
playing a game, helps extend external validity to reliable phenomena. Timing methods 
were an important factor in Study 3, where it was found that having more complex timing 
methods was significantly related to completing more Sudoku games. Results from Study 
3 relate to earlier findings regarding the complexity of stimuli and its effects on timing 
responses. Brown (1995) found that the faster moving stimuli on a computer screen 
generally lengthened perceived time to a greater degree than slower speeds, but in the 
case of Study 3 the faster the participant moved through the Sudoku task, the more 
accurate the interval. Discussing interference while considering fluency of the non-timing 
task may be an important variable to consider. Additionally, instructional control and 
self-generated rules may have facilitated game performance while inhibiting interval 
production. More research is needed to determine how rules function differently for 
simultaneous tasks as it relates to the interference effect.  
The cross-study comparisons revealed that, on average, participants who provided 
time estimates underestimated the target interval, whereas participants producing 
intervals typically overestimated the target interval. These results replicate what is known 
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in the psychophysics literature as the “regression effect.” By 1971 the regression effect 
was established enough for S. Stevens to comment on the problem of the different results 
obtained between “magnitude estimation” and “magnitude production.” Although this 
known differentiation has existed for nearly fifty years, we found no study that replicated 
these findings for an extended interval (e.g., 3 minutes). The significant group differences 
between time estimate and interval production found between studies replicate the 
magnitude differences sited for shorter intervals (Stevens, 1966, 1971). 
Furthermore, the psychophysics literature has very limited time-series data to 
understand tracking time over time. The cross-study findings support and expand upon 
what has previously been demonstrated in the lab, and we can start to develop new 
models around tracking time over time. Not only did a regression effect observed, but 
there were alsointeresting trends of timing consistency throughout a session of multiple 
timing trials. By only testing participants at different intervals once or twice, such as in 
the traditional procedures, we only get a snapshot of initial timing awareness. Particularly 
with interval production, repeated opportunities to produce intervals of the same length 
result in increasingly inaccurate responding, which was not observed with time estimates. 
The trend of increasing timing error over time is an important finding in of itself. With no 
timing feedback involved during the task there was no expectation that participants would 
necessarily increase in accuracy, but potentially increase in timing consistency if the 
verbal stimuli functioned as tracks. Observing the decreasing accuracy over time could 
suggest that the environmental change exerted habituation effects on the participants’ 
timing responses. Given the initial theoretical premise that timing is a reflection of the 
time-bound response coming under the stimulus control of relevant change in the 
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environment, a continuous task like playing Sudoku could result in the subtle stimulus 
changes losing stimulus control over the button pressing throughout the session.  
The second aim of the research conducted was to investigate the various verbal 
stimuli and verbal behaviors that may influence human timing responses. The literature 
review highlighted a sample of studies that examined the role of verbal behavior as either 
discriminative stimuli or collateral behavior for tracking time; however, little has been 
said about the function of verbal behavior on timing, such as relational framing and rule 
following. The presented studies set to clarify several examples of how verbal behavior 
interacts with timing responses.  
Results suggested that there could be some influence of self-generated rules 
around tracking time by tracking game behavior, although, the form of timing response 
required may have played a role on the rule’s relative effectiveness. In Study 1, the 
participants who reported having a timing method also provided significantly more 
accurate time estimates throughout the Sudoku session than participants who did not 
claim to have a timing method. For Studies 2 and 3 however, having a method, even 
when accounting for the complexity of the method, had no significant effect on the 
timing dependent measures. Originally, the intent of the study was to examine the effects 
of the instructions on timing behavior. The instructions did appear to set the occasion for 
participants to develop timing methods that were more specific and constructive than the 
participants who did not see the instructions. The timing methods as a mediating factor 
for effective timing, however, did not reduce timing error or variability for interval 
production responses.  
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That timing methods seemed to only be effective at improving timing accuracy 
and consistency for timing estimates may indicate that there are particular conditions 
under which self-generated rules affect other repertoires like timing. Since timing 
estimates arguably require a verbal repertoire, this form of timing response may be more 
susceptible to rule governance. Interval production does not require a verbal repertoire, as 
demonstrated by previous animal studies (Jasselette, Lejeune, & Wearden, 1990), which 
could imply that rules interact differently with nonverbal repertoires. Insofar as the self-
generated rules functioned as tracks for participants in Study 1, the same cannot be said 
for the participants in Study 2 and 3. There was a greater connection, however between 
timing methods and Sudoku performance. The differing effects of self-generated rules on 
performing simultaneous tasks could provide an additional layer to analyzing problem 
solving and deductive reasoning required for completing Sudoku puzzles.  
Limitations. Throughout this dissertation process, several limitations were noted 
and are worth discussing to promote increasingly progressive verbal timing research. 
First, an inherent challenge to doing timing research for longer duration means that fewer 
data points can be collected over time. Furthermore, pronounced individual differences 
become even more distracting at longer intervals, which leaves room for greater 
variation. Study 3 attempted to control for the individual variation by adding the initial 
three-minute timer, but the additional discriminative stimulus did not exert lasting 
stimulus control over the participant’s timing behavior throughout the session. 
The strength of the verbal interventions selected for Studies 2 and 3 were not 
effective at producing an effect between groups. This could have been due to the verbal 
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manipulations being too subtle or weak to establish stimulus control over interval 
production. It is too soon to say that self-generated rules do not impact less-verbally 
mediated timing responses, rather it could be that either: the participants selected were 
verbal adults with extensive learning histories with respect to time which could make 
them less sensitive to simple instructions, or that the instructions were too ambiguous or 
subtle a contingency to have an effect. The instructions were chosen based on the 
literature around instructional control and tracking, while also considering the most 
minimal verbal unit possible so as to not introduce confounding variables that may be 
introduced with complex independent variables. Nevertheless, replicating these studies 
with children or with a more explicit verbal intervention may have produced stronger 
effects. 
Findings associated with  self-reports from the post-experiment questionnaire 
provided a basis for making inferences about a participant’s history and less observable 
behaviors as it relates to the main task; however, since they were measured post-hoc, 
claims cannot be made regarding causality of the methods as they relate to timing 
accuracy or task performance. Future research interested in investigating timing methods 
or task strategy should consider procedures (e.g., talk-aloud, silent dog method) that more 
directly record whether the participant is utilizing a timing method or strategy. 
Finally, the time estimates recorded were not from the same individuals who 
produced intervals. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, the interesting 
differences in timing responses were discovered post hoc. Given the findings presented 
above, research further exploring differences in timing responses should consider more 
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robust within-subject comparisons. While the interference and regression effects were 
replicated at a three-minute interval, it cannot be assumed that they are the only 
explanations for the trends observed. The cross-study comparisons of timing accuracy 
relative to operant response show promise but should not be considered definitive. For 
example, the target interval was exactly three minutes. With a time estimate task, it is 
natural to assume that participants might estimate in whole minutes, which could have 
artificially constrained the accuracy and variability. Other creative procedures could be 
used to alternate between timing estimates and interval production, perhaps using less 
predictable intervals (e.g., 3.6 minutes) over multiple sessions, for more robust findings. 
Future research. Many new research questions have emerged as a result of these 
studies. With some initial promising data based on novel procedures, more externally 
valid timing research may be more likely. Future research could investigate and challenge 
the established timing effects found for shorter intervals. For example, in response to 
Brown (1995), one could investigate how imposed stimulus change versus rates of 
environmental change in the participant’s control may differentially influence interval 
production. Future research could also explore the repertoire of developing simple and 
compound strategies for tasks as it relates to behavioral variability required of the types 
of skills required to excel at problem solving tasks, like Sudoku.  
Or, researchers interested in replicating other findings with longer intervals could 
do multiple trials of a variety of intervals to test Weber’s law and relative matching for 
different durations.  A potential replication and extension of these studies could be done 
to track within-subject correlations between timing estimates and interval productions for 
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the same interval over time. Those interested in how the regression effect might be put to 
use in applied settings could investigate how different timing responses might influence 
the one’s satisfaction or comfort with a particular interval. For example, when waiting in 
a line, customers could be given an interval production task rather than response to 
reflective survey on the time spent in line. Since the research suggests that people are 
more likely to overestimate time with an interval production, they may find that an 
imposed “wait time” may go faster or be more enjoyable. 
Two findings regarding verbal behavior and human timing demonstrate 
considerable promise. Providing time estimates appeared to be more positively affected 
by having a rule regarding timing; and presenting instructions about noticing 
environmental change did occasion the self-generation of rules. More research is needed 
to determine how verbal behavior interrelated with interval production. Clearly, simple 
instructions did not establish stimulus control over the timing response; thus, more 
elaborate or intensive verbal interventions may be required before patterns of interval 
production are found. 
Furthermore, evaluating the longitudinal trends of tracking time could lead to 
research that answers applied questions regarding persistence, situational awareness, and 
time management. Without knowing how individuals report their timing experience, 
either by estimates or producing an interval, over time it is harder to gauge how other 
time-related behavior might be effected by one’s awareness of time to begin with. Across 
Studies 2 and 3, each group regardless of level, replicated a similar pattern where timing 
responses decreased in accuracy from phase 1 to phase 2 and either stabilized from phase 
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2 to phase 3. The addition of the three-minute timer for Study 3 did successfully ensure 
that the first interval production was near perfect accuracy, that initial exposure did not 
have lasting effects. Future research could investigate how different forms and rates of 
timing feedback could effectively train timing accuracy and consistency. 
Future research should also consider the promising connection between 
mindfulness skills and timing awareness. Although not significant, previous mindfulness 
experience also had some interesting relationships with timing. For the participants who 
reported experiencing some form of mindfulness activity, interval production was closer 
to the target interval and more stable, whereas those with no mindfulness experience 
displayed the overall response pattern of increasing inaccuracy over time. The studies 
were limited in exploring mindfulness as a functional variable in that mindfulness was 
not very clearly defined in the survey, and there were large individual differences in the 
intensity and sophistication of mindfulness exposure each participant reported having. 
Mindfulness experiments could add timing components either requiring time estimates of 
interval production throughout mindfulness training to determine the degree to which the 
two repertoires are related. 
VII. Conclusions 
  The introduction of this dissertation began by referring to Matthews and Meck 
(2014) commentary on the problems in timing research: susceptibility of time judgments 
on extraneous variables, major findings only robust at the group level, and low external 
validity. With the three studies presented here, I hope to begin resolving those three 
issues. Indeed, it quickly became evident that timing is greatly affected by the 
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surrounding context, such as the interference effect observed with participants playing 
Sudoku. The more that research focuses on important contextual factors, however, the 
more the extraneous variables become accounted for. In particular, verbal behavior is 
likely to be a major extraneous variable that seldom has been addressed in the timing 
literature. Behavior analysis also has much to offer this area in that its traditionally 
single-subject methodologies allow for rigorous within-subject studies that help 
illuminate the order of timing behavior over time. And finally, this dissertation attempted 
to highlight the relevance of the timing literature to applied settings and designed studies 
that will hopefully make it easier for translational and applied research on timing in the 
future. 
The more we understand about how verbal behavior interacts with timing, the 
more we will be able to expand basic research findings into application. Most of the 
review and critique of the existing literature has focused on research opportunities in the 
laboratory. Therefore, the following discussion focuses on just a few of the possibilities 
of how further investigations of language and time could elevate the existing work done 
in applied research areas.  
Scholars interested in understanding “situation awareness” also investigate the 
various factors that impact a person’s behavior in a moment-to-moment basis. In a way, 
one can view those moments as extremely constricted temporal intervals, like during an 
emergency. Despite the explicit appeal to time and timing, there is little understanding of 
how timing awareness relates to situation awareness. With a better understanding about 
how to effectively orient an individual to relevant stimulus events for effectively track 
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time, there could be an opportunity to shape up the repertoires responsible for developing 
situation awareness. 
Time and timing are important factors in organizational settings. Deadlines are 
inherent aspects of professional life, thus those with scholarly interests in business and 
organizational psychology have addressed time as a feature of the work environment. A 
recent review on the time management literature by Claessens, van Eerde, Rutte, and Roe 
(2007) noted that there was no common definition of “time management,” which is a 
similar problem to the subject of time itself. Claessens and colleagues explicitly called 
out the need for operationalized definitions and theoretical frameworks for studying time 
management, but do not include any definition or theory of “time” except to say that it 
“cannot be managed, because it is an inaccessible factor” (p. 256). Overall, the literature 
provided some general support of time management, as a construct, accounts for some 
variance in people’s work performance and perception of control; but less is known about 
how these repertoires are developed, the conditions under which the repertoires are 
shaped and maintained, and why. Similar concerns have been noted by others, including 
Green and Skinner (2005) who reviews the mixed effectiveness of time management 
trainings. Even if it is generally accepted that time management, problem solving, and 
sequencing activities are related to one’s learned relation to time, there is yet to be 
consensus on the degree and direction of this relationship. For a systemic science of 
timing, basic researchers may do well to disseminate their findings in a way that would 
be useful for researchers interested in applied issues.  
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The presented work attempted to serve two overarching values: (1) maintaining 
the tenets of functional contextualism, and (2) advocating for systemic scientific 
progress. As such, the following research aimed to understand time as it occurs for most 
people outside of a laboratory. Rather than discriminating between second-long intervals, 
human activity largely revolves around completing complex tasks, while engaging in 
various forms of verbal behavior, such as temporal framing and self-generating rules. 
Building a bridge between mechanistic and contextualistic programs of research will 
result in a mutual benefit: with new avenues for basic scientists to explore while 
providing a foundation for practitioners to apply relevant findings to improve timing 
related issues in the field. No time has ever been more appropriate like the present to call 
for integrative scientific work that demonstrates coherence and cohesion. A more 
systemic science of time, that relates the various findings and expands upon procedures in 
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Table 1. Various definitions of time in psychology 
Author(s) Year Page Definition / Description 
Gibson 1975 299 A concept “abstracted from the percepts of events” and 




2010 119 “Time is a dynamic stimulus, along which one 
temporal value cannot be discriminated from another 
until the carrier signal (e.g., a light or a tone) 
terminates, or at least passes some threshold value” 
Hayes & 
Hayes 
1989 185 “Time is a measure of change” 
Killeen 2014 155 “Common time is an artifact, no less than mathematical 
time. But it is a directly, if diversely, measured 
artifact” 
Zakay 2016 54 “Psychological time refers to a sense of the passage of 
[physical time] and temporal experiences related to 
succession, duration, simultaneity, pace and the order 
of perceived external and internal events” 
 
 
Table 2. Study schema for successive replication and extension of procedures  




typed response into 
question box 
Interval production, free-
operant button press 
Interval production, 
free-operant button press 
Interval? 3 min 3 min 3 min 
Intervention? Alternating time 
units (seconds and 
minutes) in the 
question text 
4 groups: Control*, 
Behavior, Breath, Self-rule 
*Control= no button 
feedback 
3 groups: Control, 
Behavior, Breath 




• Typed response 
• Unit of time in 
question 
• Timing pattern of 
question 
appearance 
• Timing method 
(y/n) 
• Presence absence of 
instructions (for 
experimental groups) 
• Timing method (y/n) 
• Timing explanation 
• Self-reports about timing 
• Presence absence of 
instructions (for 
experimental groups) 
• Timing method (y/n) 
• Timing explanation 
(w/ code for 
complexity) 





Table 3. Point contingency for Study 1 Sudoku program (for game completion) 
Minutes Seconds Points 
< 5 < 300 500 
5-6 301-360 450 
6-7 361-420 400 
7-8 421-480 350 
8-9 481-540 300 
9-10 541-600 250 
10-11 601-660 200 
11-12 661-720 150 
12-13 721-780 100 
13-14 781-840 50 
15+ 841+ 25 
 
 
Table 4. Additional point contingency for Study 2 Sudoku program (for time button) 
Time Difference 
(seconds from 180) 
Points 
0 1,000 
+/- 29 500 
+/- 30-59 300 
+/- 60-119 100 
+/- 120-179 50 
+ 180 0 
 
 
Table 5. Study 2: Average rates of button pressing throughout session, by group 
Group n 0-12 min 12-21 min 21-30 min Total 
Control 12 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.22 
Behavior 9 0.23 0.32 0.36 0.30 
Breath 10 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.30 






Table 6. Study 2: Average constant error and variability of intervals (in seconds), by 
group 
  Control Behavior Breath Self-rule 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
0-12 min 108.40 125.37 18.68 81.46 -8.92 66.65 17.10 58.47 
12-21 min 58.13 125.21 -2.10 80.23 -17.50 120.68 63.93 83.61 




Table 7. Study 2: Observed button presses within 3-minute intervals across groups  
  Control Behavior Breath Self-rule 
n 11 9 10 7 
Mean 6.55 8.89 9.00 8.00 
SD 2.81 2.23 4.22 1.20 
Min 4 5 3 6 
Max 14 12 18 10 
 
 
Table 8. Study 2: Average game duration and duration variation (in seconds), by group 
 n Duration SD 
Control 11 436.61 271.76 
Behavior 9 509.84 298.59 
Breath 10 553.82 294.35 





Table 9. Study 3: Participant responses for post-experiment survey questions regarding 
relevant learning histories, for whole and by group 
Question Scale Total Control Behavior Breath 
Very familiar 4 1 0 3 
Somewhat familiar  26 8 9 9 
Acquainted 14 4 5 5 
Not very familiar  16 7 6 3 
Not familiar at all 1 0 1 0 
Yes 12 5 3 4 
Maybe 16 5 3 8 
No 33 10 15 8 
Extremely well 5 1 2 2 
Very well 9 4 3 2 
Moderately well 29 14 5 10 
Slightly well 12 0 7 5 
Not well at all 6 1 4 1 
 





Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.501 2 1.750 1.870 .163 
Within Groups 54.302 58 .936   
Between Groups 1.67 2 .839 1.348 .268 
Within Groups 36.09 58 .622   
Between Groups 3.488 2 1.744 1.655 .200 
Within Groups 61.102 58 1.053   
 
 
Table 11. Study 3: Within-subject differences in constant error between phase 1 (3-12 
minutes) and phases 2 and 3 (12-21 minutes, 21-30 minutes, respectively) for each group 
      95% Confidence Interval  





2 -31.17 18.55 .11 -70.018 7.670 
3 -25.01 24.77 .32 -76.875 26.845 
2 -26.30 19.79 .20 -67.879 15.280 
3 -13.21 19.89 .51 -55.000 28.576 
2 -25.43* 8.695 .01 -43.634 -7.238 




Table 12. Study 3: Within group correlations of constant error and interval variability for 
each group and total sample 
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Pearson  .797** .11 .41 .66** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .68 .10 .002 
N 11 16 17 19 
Pearson  .838** .68** .61** .45* 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .003 .01 .04 
N 13 17 18 20 
Pearson  .34 .70** .85** .88** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .21 .001 <.001 <.001 
N 15 20 18 20 
Pearson  .78** .54** .55** .64** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
N 39 53 53 59 
 
 
Table 13. Study 3: Within-group comparison of completed game rate between phases 
 Phase Phase Mean Diff 
Std. 
Error Sig. 





2 -.35* .15 .03 -.664 -.036 
3 -.45* .18 .02 -.836 -.064 
2 -.47* .19 .02 -.879 -.068 
3 -.47 .23 .06 -.965 .018 
2 -.10 .17 .58 -.469 .269 






Table 14. Study 3: Within-group correlations of constant error and game completion for 
each group and total sample 
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Pearson  -.09 -.50* -.08 -.27 
Sig. (2-tailed) .70 .02 .75 .24 
N 20 20 20 20 
Pearson  .50* .25 .16 .37 
Sig. (2-tailed) .03 .28 .49 .10 
N 20 20 21 21 
Pearson  -.11 -.35 -.50* -.46* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .63 .13 .02 .04 
N 20 20 20 20 
Pearson  .002 -.21 -.09 -.19 
Sig. (2-tailed) .99 .11 .50 .14 
N 60 60 61 61 
 
 
Table 15. Study 3: Within-group correlations of the variability of intervals and game 
completion for each group and total sample 
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Pearson  -.17 -.02 -.18 -.30 
Sig. (2-tailed) .62 .94 .48 .21 
N 11 16 17 19 
Pearson  .14 .42 .37 .08 
Sig. (2-tailed) .66 .09 .13 .72 
N 13 17 18 20 
Pearson  -.14 -.16 -.24 -.40 
Sig. (2-tailed) .62 .51 .34 .08 
N 15 20 18 20 
Pearson  -.19 .08 -.07 -.27* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .25 .56 .62 .04 
N 39 53 53 59 
 
 
Table 16. Study 3: Frequencies of coded timing methods for pushing the time button (yes, 
indicating that they did use a method) 
















/ guess Other 
Yes 22 3 9 8 4 3 2 1 1 





Table 17. Study 3: Count data of participant timing method complexity across groups 
  Generic Simple Complex 
Control 11 8 1 
Behavior 6 7 8 
Breath 7 11 2 
Total 24 26 11 
 
 
Table 18. Study 3: Within-group comparison of constant error across phases based on 












2 -33.899* 12.487 .011 -59.401 -8.397 
3 -40.045* 14.256 .009 -69.159 -10.931 
2 -20.751 13.915 .147 -49.302 7.801 
3 -.450 15.870 .978 -33.012 32.113 
 
 
Table 19. Study comparison of relative error (difference in seconds from 180 seconds) 
across phases 
  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Study 1 -29.59 -16.98 -3.21 
Study 2 0.58 -4.01 10.52 






Figure 1. Each participant average accuracy of timing estimate is graphed according to 
the variability of their own responses. Scatter plot demonstrates the broad spectrum of 




Figure 2. Two groups naturally emerged in the sample for Study 1, where 10 participants 
correctly identified that the questions appeared at the same time every time (i.e., a fixed 
schedule) and the remaining 17 replied that they thought the message boxes were varied 
(i.e., a variable schedule). The y-axis describes the percentage of questions (out of 10) 























Average timing accuracy (seconds difference from 180s target)




Figure 3. Breakdown of participants according to experience in higher education. 
 
 
Figure 4. Experimental design for Study 2. All Sudoku sessions were 30 minutes (1800 
seconds) long. The Control group as the baseline message and then had 30 minutes of 
uninterrupted play. Each experimental group saw statements at three different points, 


























Figure 5. Average rate of button pressing throughout Sudoku session, by group. The x-
axis marks the three phases and their respective durations. Each line indicates their 
experimental group, with the blue line (circle markers) representing the control 
participants, who received no special instructions throughout the game. Black dotted line 
serves as a reference at 0.33, which would be the rate if a participant’s rate averaged 1 
press per 3 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 6. Average timing accuracy as measured by the absolute value of the time of the 
interval minus the target interval (i.e., 180 seconds). The x-axis marks the three phases 
and their respective durations. Each line indicates their experimental group, with the blue 
line representing the control participants, who received no special instructions throughout 





























Study 2: Average Button Presses per Minute throughout Session






























Study 2: Constant Error throughout Session




Figure 7. Average standard deviation of duration of timing estimates for groups over the 
30-minute session. The x-axis marks the three phases and their respective durations. Each 
line indicates their experimental group, with the blue line (circle markers) representing 
the control participants, who received no special instructions throughout the game. Black 
dotted line serves as a reference at 0, which would be the variability score if a participant 
was 100% consistent throughout the session. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average cumulative button presses per 3-minute interval calculated within each 
group. The dotted black line indicates where the first experimental message appeared 
(after a 12-minute baseline). The dotted gray line indicates where the same message 
























Study 2: Interval Production Variability throughout Session 








































Figure 9. Standard deviation of group button presses per 3-minute interval, which 
accounts for the variability of timing within the group, over the course of the session. The 
dotted black line indicates where the first experimental message appeared (after a 12-





























Seconds (in 3-minute intervals)
Study 2: Standard Deviation of Cumulative Group Button Presses

























Figure 12. Distribution of participant rating their level of preparedness to play the Sudoku 





















































Study 2: Level of preparedness after training








Figure 14. Experimental design for the Study 3. All Sudoku sessions were 30 minutes 
(1800 seconds) long, with a timed alarm sounding after the first 3 minutes (180 seconds). 
After which, the Control group as the baseline message and then had 27 minutes of 
uninterrupted play. Each experimental group saw statements at two different points. 












Like a great deal Like somewhat Neither like nor
dislike















Study 2: Playing Sudoku for Extended Periods of Time




Figure 15. Distribution of participant responses to the question “How well do you track 




Figure 16. Percentage of participants who pressed the time button fewer than 3 times in 9 
minutes (called “Over” in orange), exactly 3 times (called “On” in black) and more than 3 
























































Study 3: Over- and underestimation of average interval production




Figure 17. Calculated average for button presses per minute based on the average number 
of button presses per phase, divided by the nine-minute phase. Accurate rate was 




Figure 18. Average timing responses (i.e., button presses) were organized into 30, 1-
minute intervals for the 30-minute session and recorded the individual response 







































































































































































Figure 19. Average number of completed games, organized by group. 
 
 
Figure 20. Cumulative record of program clicks, for entering numbers into the puzzle 
(“Sudoku clicks” measured on left y-axis) and pressing the time button (“Button presses” 

























































































Seconds (in real time)
Study 3: Comparative behavior in Sudoku task for Control group




Figure 21. Cumulative record of program clicks, for entering numbers into the puzzle 
(“Sudoku clicks”, measured on left y-axis) and pressing the time button (“Button clicks”, 
measured on the right y-axis) for the Control group (n =20). Data grouped based on 
determined “high rate” and “low rate” button pressing groups and the corresponding 
participant data for Sudoku activity. 
 
 
Figure 22. Averaged cumulative timing responses recorded in real-time seconds. The 
dotted black line in dictates what perfectly accurate and precise responding would look 
like across the session. The vertical dotted blue lines indicate where the messages 



















































Seconds (in real time)
Study 3: Comparing Sudoku responses and button presses (High v Low 
Button Rates)
Game Activity for High Rate Game Activity for Low Rate






























































































































Study 3: Cumulative Button Presses by Group




Figure 23. Within group variability, calculated by averaging the standard deviation of 
each individual’s cumulative responses (recorded frequencies in 9 three-minute intervals) 
for each group. Steeper slopes indicate greater within group variability over time, 




Figure 24. Group averages of timing accuracy (absolute value of the response difference 
























Seconds (3-min interval blocks)






































Figure 25. Comparing timing accuracy throughout session based on participant’s self-
reported ability to track time on a daily basis. Well (green line) consolidated the 
participants who indicated that they track time either “Extremely well” or “Very well.” 
Medium (orange line) consists of the participants who responded “Moderately well.” 




Figure 26. Comparing timing accuracy throughout session based on participant’s 


























































Study 3: Constant Error Based on Previous Mindfulness Training




Figure 27. Averaged cumulative timing responses for each of the three studies. Study 1 
(blue line) represent the hypothetical cumulative estimates of time throughout the session. 
The primary y-axis indicates each instance the question prompted the individual to type a 
time estimate. The x-axis then for Study 1 marks the estimated ‘time into session’ at each 
question. Study 2 (orange line) and Study 3 (green line) represent the cumulative seconds 
into session that participants completed each interval by pressing the time button. The 
secondary y-axis indicates each instance, on average, when participants pressed the time 
button. The x-axis for Studies 2 and 3 marks the 1-minute bins into which the interval 













































































One Minute Real-Time Intervals (in seconds)
Study Comparison: Averaged Timing Responses throughout Session




Study 1: Sudoku Program Arrangements 
Below are screen clips depicting both the Sudoku interface and the message box prompt 
for the participant to type in a time estimate. Sudoku puzzles were randomly generated 
but programmed to remain at about the same level of difficulty, with only 33 empty cells. 
The message box presented is an example of the first question asked, every subsequent 
question asked for a response since the last time the question was asked. Performance in 
Sudoku program correlated with number of tickets entered into the raffle for each 
participant. Table for point-to-ticket distribution listed at the bottom. 
 
 









Study 2: Sudoku Program Arrangements 
Below are screen clips depicting both the Sudoku interface with the green timing button, 
and sample screen of the phrases for the experimental conditions. Sudoku puzzles were 
kept at the same level of difficulty as in Study 1. Performance in Sudoku program 
correlated with number of tickets entered into the raffle, for each participant. Table for 
point-to-ticket distribution listed at the bottom. 
 
Above: Program interface with time button; Below: Example screen message for the 
Behavior group. 
 









Study 2: Sudoku Training Script 
How to Play Sudoku (SCRIPT) 
 
Sudoku is a puzzle game that relies on deduction. The game is on a 9 x 9 grid with 9 
squares that are each 3 x 3 (so nine boxes in each square).  
Your objective is to fill all of the squares so that the numbers 1-9 appear exactly one time 
in each row, column, and 3X3 box. (Show a column, row, and box) 
To finish the puzzle, each of the 9 squares must be filled with the numbers 1 through 9.  
As you can see, some of the spaces are already filled in so you just have to fill in the 
blank spaces with the remaining numbers. 
 
There are two rules to Sudoku: 
1. No number can repeat on a given row or column. Look at the blank cell in the top 
left corner. The number missing in that row and column is “2”. 
2. No number can repeat in the same 3x3 square. The number “2” can only be in this 
3 x 3 square once. [Point out that there is a “2” in the 3rd row and 2nd column 
which means the “2” cannot go in the other blank cell.] 
 
Here are some tips on how to play the game: 
1. Use process of elimination. If you see one number in a column, row, or square, 
then that number cannot be placed in the same column, row, or square. 
2. Use the numbers already on the board to determine which numbers go where. 
This is NOT a guessing game. Guessing can lead to making errors that are 




[Flip the instruction sheet over to reveal the ‘mini’ practice puzzle. Have them identify a 
blank square and have them tell you what numbers belong in the blank cells. Once they 
get 3 right in a row, direct them to the Practice Puzzle. If they make a mistake, tell 
them the correct answer and explain why (1) their answer was wrong, and (2) why your 





[Write the current time on the Practice Puzzle sheet. Hand it to the participant.]  
Once you have completed the practice puzzle, let me know. I’ll double check to make 
sure your answers are correct. Once you complete it without errors, you will move on to 
the real Sudoku game on the computer. 









Qualtrics Survey Questions for Final Study 
 
[Survey Title] Diss Time - Study 3 (DISSERTATION) 




What year are you in school? 
 1 (Freshman) (1) 
 2 (Sophomore) (2) 
 3 (Junior) (3) 
 4 (Senior) (4) 
 5+ years (5) 
 
What is your major? (If you have not selected a major yet, type "Undeclared.") 
 
With which gender do you identify? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 Transgender (3) 
 Other (4) 




With which race do you identify? 
 African American / Black (1) 
 American Indian / Native American (2) 
 Asian American / Pacific Islander (4) 
 Caucasian / White (6) 
 Hispanic / Latino (5) 
 Other (7) 
 I prefer not to answer. (8) 
 
Are you an international student? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (3) 
 
How familiar were you with Sudoku before today? 
 Very familiar (I play Sudoku regularly.) (1) 
 Somewhat familiar (I've played Sudoku a few times.) (2) 
 Acquainted (I knew the rules, but not sure if I've completed a game.) (3) 
 Not very familiar (I'd heard of Sudoku, but didn't know how to play.) (4) 
 I had never heard of Sudoku before today. (5) 
 
After the Sudoku training, how well did you feel prepared to play the game? 
 Extremely well (1) 
 Very well (2) 
 Moderately well (3) 
 Slightly well (4) 
 Not well at all (5) 
 
Which phrase fits closest to how you felt about playing Sudoku for an extended period of 
time? 
 Like a great deal (1) 
 Like somewhat (2) 
 Neither like nor dislike (3) 
 Dislike somewhat (4) 




How well do you track time in your daily life? 
 Extremely well (1) 
 Very well (2) 
 Moderately well (3) 
 Slightly well (4) 
 Not well at all (5) 
 
Have you ever received training in mindfulness or participated in mindfulness-based 
activities? 
 Yes (1) 
 Maybe (2) 
 No (3) 
 
Display This Question: 
If Have you ever received training in mindfulness or participated in mindfulness-
based activities? Yes Is Selected 
Briefly describe your experience with mindfulness training and activities. 
 
Did you have a method for estimating how much time had passed while playing the 
game? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (3) 
 
Display This Question: 
If Did you have a method for estimating how much time had passed while playing 
the game? Yes Is Selected 
What was (were) your method(s) for estimating how much time had passed while playing 
the game? 
 
Display This Question: 
If Did you have a method for estimating how much time had passed while playing 
the game? No Is Selected 
Describe what prompted you to push the green button. (If you never pushed the green 




Display This Question: 
If Did you have a method for estimating how much time had passed while playing 
the game? Yes Is Selected 
Did your timing method change over time? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (3) 
 
Display This Question: 
If Did your timing method change over time? Yes Is Selected 
How did your timing method change over time? (Please provide details such as: what rule 
you may have used and/or if anything around you prompted you to change your strategy.) 
 
Do you have any other comments or feedback about the study that you'd like the 
experimenter to know? 
 
